1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 3 4 IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation,) MD 15-02641-PHX-DGC 5 6 Lisa Hyde and Mark Hyde, a married) Phoenix, Arizona 7 couple,) September 6, 2018 Plaintiffs, 8 9) CV 16-00893-PHX-DGC v. 10 C.R. Bard, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, and Bard Peripheral Vascular, an Arizona corporation, 11 12 Defendants. 1.3 14 15 BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, JUDGE 16 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 17 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 18 19 20 21 Official Court Reporter: Patricia Lyons, RMR, CRR Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Ste. 312 2.2. 401 West Washington Street, SPC 41 23 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2150 (602) 322-7257 24 Proceedings Reported by Stenographic Court Reporter 25 Transcript Prepared with Computer-Aided Transcription

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10:00:24 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: MDL 2015-2641, in the matter 3 of Bard IVC Filters Product Liability Litigation, on for final 10:00:47 5 pretrial conference in the Hyde trial. Will the parties please announce. 6 7 MR. O'CONNOR: Good morning, Your Honor. Mark 8 O'Connor, co-lead attorney for plaintiffs. 9 MS. REED ZAIC: Julia Reed Zaic, plaintiffs' executive committee. 10:00:58 10 11 MR. LOPEZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Ramon Lopez, 12 co-lead and attorney for the Hydes, plaintiffs Hydes. 13 MR. GOLDENBERG: Stuart Goldenberg, Your Honor, for the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee. 14 MS. SMITH: Laura Smith. 10:01:08 15 MR. NORTH: Good morning, Your Honor. Richard North 16 17 on behalf of the defendants, and I am joined by James Rogers, James Condo, Elizabeth Helm, and Matthew Lerner. 18 And, Your Honor, I also want to alert the Court that 19 Mr. Rogers will be taking the lead today because he's going to 10:01:23 20 be the lead trial counsel in the Hyde case. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 Good morning, everybody. Welcome back. Hope you all 24 had a nice summer. 10:01:47 25 The first thing I would like to do is deal with the

juror issues. I've issued two orders excluding folks for 10:01:49 1 2 hardship. Those are dockets 12113 and 12375. Those excuse a 3 total of 85 jurors for hardship. Does either side have an objection to any of those 10:02:08 5 excusals? MR. O'CONNOR: No objection from the plaintiffs. 6 7 MR. ROGERS: None, Your Honor, from the defendant. 8 THE COURT: Okay, then we will excuse the 85 jurors 9 listed in those two dockets. 10:02:21 10 In addition, as I think you learned yesterday, we 11 have received a few additional jury questionnaires. By my 12 count, looks like there are six that came in. I reviewed those and concluded that I should excuse Juror 19 and Juror 13 175. 14 10:02:46 15 Any objection to excusing those two? MR. ROGERS: None from the defendant, Your Honor. 16 17 do note what we received -- we didn't get a 175. We got a 179. 18 THE COURT: Oh, you're right. It's 179. 19 MR. O'CONNOR: I apologize, Your Honor, I did not see 10:02:59 20 that come through yesterday and I don't know anybody in my 21 22 office saw it to go through it --23 THE COURT: It was e-mailed to you about 9:30 24 yesterday morning. 10:03:19 25 Look, if you would --

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                       MR. O'CONNOR: I'm not going to object to hardships.
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                        THE COURT: Okay. Both of them on page 2 of their
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               questionnaires say they would face a hardship for various
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               reasons.
10:03:29
                        So I take it there's no objection on those?
                       MR. O'CONNOR: No objection.
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                        THE COURT: Okay. But we have, then, four others
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               that are in the group. They are jurors 21, 35, 42, and 144.
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              And you haven't seen copies of their questionnaires,
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              Mr. O'Connor?
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                       MR. O'CONNOR: No, but I don't think that has to
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               delay what we're going to do. If we could hold those off to
               the end, give me an opportunity to look at those, I would
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               appreciate that, Your Honor.
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10:04:00 15
                        THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.
                        And you can actually look at our copies, if you want,
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               and see if you have any concerns about them.
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                        Okay.
                    (The Court and the courtroom deputy confer.)
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                        THE COURT: Okay. So the next question, then, is
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               whether you have challenges for cause based on the
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              questionnaire answers. Why don't we start with plaintiffs and
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              get your challenges for cause based on the questionnaires.
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: Yes. We have a number of them, Your
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              Honor. Would you like me to go through them?
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                        THE COURT: Yeah. After I wipe all the water I just
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               spilled on my iPad.
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                        Okay. Go ahead, Mr. O'Connor.
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, do you mind if I remain
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               seated for my --
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                        THE COURT: I do not. That's fine.
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: First of all, one thing we noted in
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              going through it, it looked as though number 2 may have a
               hardship. He had indicated that he would be missing classes
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               that seemed to be going on at the same time, and I think he
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               answered that all the way at the end.
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                        THE COURT: He said in response to question number 1
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              that jury service would not create a hardship for him.
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: I was looking at question 64.
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                        THE COURT: Yeah, I see that.
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                        I don't see where he says anything else in his
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               questionnaire about those college classes.
                        MR. O'CONNOR: He said, "If selected, I would be
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               unable to attend college classes this semester."
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                        I just wanted to bring that to the Court's attention.
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              We may be dealing with that when he shows up here live.
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                        THE COURT: Do you see anything else in his
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              questionnaire about --
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                       MR. O'CONNOR: Nothing else.
10:06:17 25
                       THE COURT: -- what college he attends?
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10:06:19 1 MR. O'CONNOR: There was nothing else. 2 THE COURT: Looks like he says he's attended some 3 classes in fire science. 4 I think we ought to ask him. I don't know if he's saying he's contemplating possibly attending college classes 10:06:29 5 6 and it won't, or if he's actually enrolled and it will create 7 a problem. 8 So thanks for pointing that out, but I think we ought 9 to raise that with him when he comes. MR. O'CONNOR: And the other preliminary issue is 10:06:41 10 Juror Number 9. He indicated that his mother works at 11 12 Gallagher and Kennedy. I have no idea who that is. But I 13 believe Juror 9 had indicated some knowledge of the IVC litigation and apparently it's through his mother working at 14 10:07:00 15 the firm. We have no idea who his mother would be. 16 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I believe he addresses those 17 in question 63 and 40, if that would help you. THE COURT: Yeah, he says his mother works there. He 18 knows that the firm represents such cases. That seems to me 19 10:07:30 20 to be a relatively close connection, even though we don't know who the individual is. 21 22 What are your thoughts on it, Mr. O'Connor? MR. O'CONNOR: Well, I brought it to the Court's and 23 counsel's attention. I didn't go to human resources and find 24 10:07:47 25 out. I don't know anybody with that last name. But I don't

think we would have any objection to this one being excused. 10:07:50 1 2 THE COURT: Mr. Rogers. 3 MR. ROGERS: We agree, Your Honor. 4 10:08:02 5 MR. ROGERS: Yes. 6 7 8 9 10:08:15 10 11 12 13 14 10:08:43 15 16 17 lawsuits and greedy plaintiff's attorneys. 18 19 10:09:04 20 21 2.2. before she even got here to this courtroom, so we would move 23 to have her struck for cause. 24 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, we disagree. This juror was 10:09:28 25 given the opportunity to answer four questions about whether

THE COURT: Do you think he should be excused? THE COURT: All right. I think he should as well. It may be it's an attenuated connection, but when somebody actually works for one of the firms involved in the case, I think that's a close enough connection that I should grant the challenge for cause. So I will excuse Juror 9 for cause. MR. O'CONNOR: Beginning with cause, Juror Number 16, Your Honor. And the questions that are concerning where it appears this juror definitely would have a predisposition against the plaintiff begin at 36. And I think if you look at the other answers in conjunction with each other, she supports tort reform at number 59 and made it a point that the reason she thinks it's necessary is because there's frivolous So based upon that, we believe that this juror clearly has indicated in writing that she would have a predisposition against our side, one that's obviously formed

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she would be biased or whether she thought she might not be able to be impartial, and those were questions 39, 44, 62, and 63. And of all those responses she indicated each time she does not note a reason why she could not be unbiased.

She also answered question 59, which is the question that asks if she had any strong feelings about people that bring lawsuits, and she said no.

So I think there's enough balance there, Your Honor, that she should not be struck for cause.

THE COURT: I think this juror requires additional questioning, so I'm not going to grant the challenge for cause at this time. But you certainly can inquire on those matters during voir dire.

MR. O'CONNOR: The next one we have is number 40, Your Honor. Apparently he is a medical doctor who uses IVC filters. He appears to be an equal opportunity disliker. He doesn't like us and he doesn't like them.

He has a personal bias against IVCs but he also indicates in 63 straight out that he cannot be fair. So we'd move for cause on number 40.

MR. ROGERS: We agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I agree as well. He clearly indicates that his views would affect his ruling in the case. So I'm going to grant the challenge for cause to Juror 40.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I apologize I didn't bring

this one up earlier. 49 indicated at question 64 that he is set to go to the Bahamas during this trial. I think 64 is where I saw it.

THE COURT: You're right. He does. Doesn't say it on question 1.

MR. ROGERS: We agree, Your Honor. I had him flagged as well as somebody who would be extremely unhappy if he had to be here.

THE COURT: All right. I will excuse Juror -- I will grant the challenge for cause to Juror 49 because of his unavailability.

MR. O'CONNOR: Our next cause is number 50, Your Honor. Question 49. He says he has strong negative feelings about people who file lawsuits and he thinks most lawsuits are against big corporations and people with a lot of money and the reason they're brought is for money.

He doesn't feel that the system should be used for retirement. His answer to question 59.

And, again, I think when a person writes these kinds of answers in response to these questions, it — it's a clear indication that he is starting out with a bias and is alerting us that these are formed, and I think that there's no reason to question him any more, that on the face, this juror has let us know he's starting out with a clear predisposition against plaintiffs and lawsuits.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, we disagree. Again, I think 10:12:53 1 2 this is similar to Juror 16. This juror responded in response 3 to at least three questions that, when he was asked if he could be impartial or not biased, he indicated that he could. 10:13:06 5 And those are the responses to 63, 39, and 44. 6 THE COURT: Like the previous juror, I think we need 7 to ask some additional questions of this juror, so I'm going 8 to deny the challenge for cause at this time, subject to further questions of him. 10:13:26 10 MR. O'CONNOR: That was number 50; correct? 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. O'CONNOR: Number 52 is a veterinarian. 13 responded, I thought it was -- let me find it. That he --14 that just knowing about the lawsuit would affect his ability 10:13:44 15 to be fair and impartial. And then at question 44 -- let me 16 find the answer. Apologize. 17 He says he feels there are a lot of frivolous lawsuits against the medical community. 18 So, again, based upon what he has clearly indicated, 19 10:14:17 20 we believe this witness has demonstrated to us and wants us to know that he is starting without with a predisposition against 21 22 us and the system in general. 23 THE COURT: Hold on just a minute, Mr. Rogers. 24 Traci, is that beeping coming from our equipment 10:14:36 25 room?

10:14:38 1 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes. I've e-mailed and I'm 2 trying to get it stopped. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Rogers. 4 MR. ROGERS: I think he falls in line with Jurors 16 10:14:45 5 and 50. He indicated in response to, again, at least three 6 questions when asked about -- if he could be impartial, and he 7 didn't see any reason why he could not. Those are responses 8 39, 62, and 63. 9 THE COURT: I think this juror requires additional 10:15:08 10 questions as well, so I'm going to deny the challenge for 11 cause at this time. 12 MR. O'CONNOR: All right. The next one we are moving 13 on, Your Honor, is number 61. 14 Clearly this juror is starting out on a scale showing 10:15:31 15 her imbalance of partiality. She gave personal injury lawyers 16 a 1 and medical device companies a 7. More importantly, she 17 says in 63 she works for a disability insurance company and therefore she cannot be fair and impartial. And so for that 18 reason, we believe that this juror should be excused. 19 The question is, "Do you know of any reason you could 10:15:53 20 not be fair and impartial, unbiased, during this lawsuit?" 21 22 She answered, "Yes, I work in disability insurance as 23 stated previously." 24 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I think we agree on this 10:16:10 25 one.

10:16:16 1 MR. O'CONNOR: I thought you would. I read 38, too. 2 THE COURT: I am going to grant the challenge for 3 cause. There's a number of comments in this questionnaire --4 MR. O'CONNOR: That's number 61? 10:17:14 5 THE COURT: -- where the juror indicates that she 6 could not be fair or says in other situations she would have 7 conscious or subconscious bias. So I will grant the challenge 8 for cause to Juror 61. 9 MR. O'CONNOR: Thank you. 10:17:31 10 Next on our list is number 66. 44 -- in answer to 11 question 44 he said he cannot be -- well, indicated he cannot 12 be fair and impartial. He has an utter distaste for PI 13 lawyers who have damaged America and its healthcare system. Later on he says that he is blaming lawyers for his need to go 14 10:17:54 15 out of country for care, I think. 16 But 49 he says that he has mostly strong feelings 17 about people who file -- negative feelings about people who file lawsuits. 18 59, he believes that legislative reform is necessary 19 10:18:12 20 because lawsuits are damaging America and affecting his ability to get health care. 21 22 And then in number 63 he says he cannot be fair and 23 impartial. He has honest dislikes and opinions as explained. 24 "I can't imagine that others honestly do not." 10:18:35 25 So clearly we believe that this juror should be

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removed for cause.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, we agree, or have no objection. This juror's obviously got extreme feelings about the American healthcare system and we agree he should be gone for cause.

THE COURT: I'm going to grant the challenge for cause to Juror 66.

MR. O'CONNOR: Next is Juror 78.

At question 44 this juror indicated she does not want to be on jury service.

At 49 she said she has strong negative feelings about people filing lawsuits. She says they're cluttering up our court system.

And at 59 she wants legislative reforms and she said because she wants doctors to come here and practice and therefore she needs caps in malpractice.

There, again, Your Honor, when you combine a juror who is telling us she does not want to be here and she's already indicating her strong feelings that were obviously formed long before she got this questionnaire, we believe this juror — we should not have to go to the task of questioning this juror in front of others.

78, Jim.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, the juror does indicate several times she could be impartial or certainly doesn't know

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any reason why she can't be impartial.

I don't have strong feelings about her, though. If Mr. O'Connor wants her gone, I'm glad to agree with him.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to grant the challenge for cause to Juror 78. I think the questionnaire clearly indicates she wouldn't want to be here and wouldn't be fair.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I have an unusual note here. 107. I couldn't understand it, but in qualifying his answer to number 64 he says, "As a prospective juror, a personal challenge I will face will be" -- I wanted to bring this to the Court's attention. It appeared he was trying to state a hardship, but to be perfectly honest, we had difficulty reading this one.

THE COURT: I think he says "As a prospective juror, a personal challenge I would face will be going from being on-the-go type individual to a slow-paced sitting type of environment individual for eight hours a day." And then I can't read the words in between, but says "even the length of the trial may be days/weeks."

I think that's what he's saying. He'll be sedentary for eight hours a day. Which we all know is true.

MR. ROGERS: I took it to mean, Your Honor, he just didn't feel like sitting through this trial. Other than that, he didn't have any indicators of bias either way.

MR. O'CONNOR: One issue with this juror though, and

I notice this with a couple others, but he specifically would not answer questions that I think are important questions about medical history related to him and his family. And obviously that's going to have to be a question both sides are going to need answers to when he comes here.

THE COURT: I agree. But I think we need to ask him those questions.

MR. O'CONNOR: All right.

Next we have on our list, Your Honor, is number 146. And starting with question 44. He believes that lawsuits are harmful to all. And that's based upon a personal experience he had.

49, he has strong negative feelings about people who file lawsuits.

He thinks a number of lawsuits are too high and verdicts are too high. That's in response to 57 and 58.

In 59 he believes that legislative reform is necessary and then -- let me make sure I have this right.

At 62 he says, "Since I have been personally sued, I believe lawsuits should not take place without new laws."

Here, again, Your Honor, this juror is clearly telling us that he is starting out with a bias against people who file lawsuits and against the system in general. He even has suggested that he thinks — he has implied that he doesn't believe in the laws today because he thinks there's new laws.

10:24:47 1 And here again, in the written word he has 2 demonstrated a predisposition obviously formed long before he 3 even got this questionnaire showing that he has 4 predisposition. And our position is we should not be forced 10:25:01 to question this witness -- juror in front of others and he 6 should be excused for cause here on the face of his 7 questionnaire. 8 MR. ROGERS: We agree, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: This juror notes that he has a number of 10:25:18 10 family members who work in healthcare and he works for a 11 pharmacy benefits company, that a previous lawsuit nearly 12 bankrupted his family. Sounds pretty personal. So I agree. I'm going to grant the challenge for cause to Juror 146. 13 MR. O'CONNOR: So next, Your Honor -- I'm getting 14 close to the end here -- number 152. 10:25:56 15 Your Honor, I'll withdraw that. I'm not going to 16 17 make a record on him. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MR. O'CONNOR: The next juror that we are moving on 10:26:45 20 is Juror 159. 21 Starting with his response to 49 where he talks about 2.2. frivolous lawsuits and then going down to -- I apologize, Your 23 Honor, I have my wrong notes. 24 Number 172. 10:27:48 25 I'll withdraw my position on number 159.

10:27:52 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. O'CONNOR: In response to question 44, the 3 question is, "Is there anything else that might affect your 4 ability to be fair and impartial? And he answers yes and goes 10:28:23 on to talk about his experience with personal injury lawyers 6 and the claims industry he would not be -- he would not likely 7 be impartial. 8 And then he has responded that he thinks that the 9 number of lawsuits are too high and money damages are too 10:28:57 10 high. 11 But the point to us, Your Honor, is in a question 12 that directly asks about being fair and impartial he says no, he does not believe he could be. 13 14 THE COURT: Which question are you referring to? 10:29:17 15 MR. O'CONNOR: Number 44. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 Mr. Rogers. MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, this juror indicates he 18 works in the auto claims area, and so I think that's probably 19 10:29:37 20 what he's talking about. Mr. O'Connor's certainly correct, in response to 21 question 44 he did say that he had an experience with personal 2.2. 23 injury lawyers that may lead him not to be impartial. But in 24 regard to several other questions, he indicated he knew of no 10:29:54 25 reason why he could not be unbiased, and those are questions

39, 62, and 63. And 39 is the question that specifically asks 10:29:58 1 2 him if he has any issues that would lead him to be unbiased in 3 a case regarding a medical product and he said he could be 4 unbiased. 10:30:17 5 THE COURT: He says in response to question 44 that 6 he likely could not be impartial based on his experience in 7 the claims industry with personal lawyers. It does appear 8 it's auto claims he's been involved with. 9 I think we need to ask this juror more questions to determine whether that would affect this case, so I'm going to 10:30:37 10 11 deny the challenge for cause to Juror 172. 12 MR. O'CONNOR: With the exception of the ones that I 13 was provided here today, Your Honor, that's all of the cause motions we have. I'll just need some time to go through 14 10:30:59 15 these. 16 THE COURT: That's fine. If you would, be sure you get that back to us because that's our only copy of those 17 18 questionnaires. 19 MR. O'CONNOR: Right. Will there be five minutes at the end where I get to look at these and go through them? 10:31:09 20 THE COURT: Sure. You can just do it during a break 21 22 in the morning and remind me to come back to that at the end. 23 Mr. Rogers. 24 MR. ROGERS: Yes, Your Honor. 10:31:19 25 Our first strike for cause is Juror Number 59.

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this gentleman is probably a little bit of the same category of the juror we just went over who had a negative experience being sued in a lawsuit.

But this individual indicates that he and his family brought a wrongful death action in regard to his sister's death and he indicates in response to question 62 and 63 that in his opinion and my family's opinion the doctor's poor standard of care caused his sister's death and that may possibly influence his ability to apply the law, was the specific term he used. So we believe he should be struck for cause, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. O'Connor.

MR. O'CONNOR: Well, he qualified it like the last one we talked about. And we're not here for any type of medical malpractice or wrongful death lawsuit. So given that, I think that both parties should be afforded to talk to this juror about his experience and then have an understanding how he would respond to the issues that are present in this case, not in a medical case. Well, not a medical malpractice case.

THE COURT: In response to question 62 he says, "It is possible this might influence my fairness," and 63 he says, "I am concerned this could influence me."

I think we need to ask him more questions. So I'm going to deny the challenge for cause to Juror 59.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, our next strike for cause is

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Juror Number 63. And this juror indicates several times that he is biased against IVC filters. He works in the healthcare industry. It's a little unclear to me exactly what he does because he says he is a project manager for Cancer Treatment Centers for America.

But in response to question 42 he says that he has heard IVC filters are very risky.

Question 39 he indicated he may not be able to be impartial because "I have a bias toward IVC filters."

And then it's clear in questions 43, 44, and 63 that he indicates he potentially cannot be fair because of his bias against IVC filters.

MR. O'CONNOR: We have no objection to that.

THE COURT: All right. I agree. He's not equivocal. He says directly "I am biased against IVC filters" and he repeats it a number of times. So I will grant the challenge for cause to Juror 63.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, our next juror is Juror Number 80.

This individual indicated that she had an uncle who got a Bard IVC filter who died shortly thereafter, and she indicates that she has to turn the TV off when she sees commercials because she gets so angry. And she also indicated that the FDA is clearly the problem in this country.

And specifically in response to question 63 she says,

"Without reading anything except what I read in the packet, 10:34:44 1 2 I've already formed an opinion in this case. The medical 3 procedure was likely unnecessary and they did it for money." 4 MR. O'CONNOR: Well, she's a naturalist. Other than 10:35:08 5 that, we don't object. 6 THE COURT: I'll grant the challenge for cause to 7 Juror 80. 8 MR. ROGERS: Next, Your Honor, is Juror Number 114. 9 This gentleman is a retired pilot and he indicates in response 10:35:27 10 to question 39 that he's unsure that he can be fair and 11 impartial because of the volume of TV commercials that he has 12 seen about IVC filters and that leads him to believe there are 13 problems with the device. 14 And that's really the big issue with him, Your Honor. 10:35:46 15 He seems to have already formed an opinion that there are 16 issues with IVC filters, and we believe he should be struck. 17 MR. O'CONNOR: Well, in response to other questions, though, Your Honor, he certainly indicates he can be fair and 18 impartial. We can't -- we can't control what people watch on 19 10:36:20 20 I think this juror -- we deserve to question this juror to find out how he'll take this evidence and whether he can 21 set the TV ads aside. 22 23 THE COURT: I agree we need more questioning of this 24 juror, so I'm going to deny the challenge for cause to 114. 10:36:45 25 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, our next and last challenge

for cause, at least with this group, is Juror 199. I don't 10:36:46 1 2 know if Mr. O'Connor will agree, but this gentleman really 3 does not indicate he has any particular biases, but he does have an IVC filter in place. He does not know the 10:37:02 manufacturer. Indicates he has not had any complications. But I think it would be potentially problematic to have this 6 7 juror on the jury, so I think he should go. 8 MR. O'CONNOR: Thanks. That's the note I couldn't 9 read. I agree. 10:37:18 10 THE COURT: I'll grant the challenge for cause to Juror 199. 11 12 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, even though there's not a 13 cause strike, there's a few more I want to bring to the 14 Court's attention. 10:37:34 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. ROGERS: I start with Juror 118. This gentleman 17 indicates that he's got a son who works as a file clerk at Snell and Wilmer. So I think he falls into the same category 18 as Juror Number 2. Or Juror Number 9. Excuse me. 19 THE COURT: Your thoughts, Mr. O'Connor? 10:37:53 20 21 MR. O'CONNOR: Yeah, no family members. I agree. 22 THE COURT: All right. I will add Juror Number 118 23 to the challenges for cause. MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, the others were individuals 24 10:38:12 25 who I think the Court may want to consider for hardship

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purposes.

Juror Number 6, for instance, did say in response to question 1 that he was not asking for any hardship, but I did want to bring to the Court's attention that he has had to have bladder surgery and has a bladder stimulator. I did want the Court to note he needs to take frequent bathroom breaks. So I wanted to bring that to the Court's attention.

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THE COURT: I think we need to ask him about the frequency. I think I've had folks like that before who were able to sit for an hour and a half on the jury. He might be able to as well, so we should ask him about that.

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MR. ROGERS: The next one, Your Honor, is Juror 68, and this is another person that I think we ought to flag for you for hardship purposes.

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This gentleman indicates he's been disabled for nine years. His wife is disabled and his son is disabled. And, again, he did not ask for hardship excuse in response to question 1, but in response to question 29 he did indicate that he was a caretaker for his wife and son who are both totally disabled.

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questionnaire.

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MR. ROGERS: Lastly, Your Honor, I wanted to bring to

THE COURT: I think we need to ask him questions

about whether that will affect his jury service. It's a fair

question, but I don't think it's answered by the

your attention Juror Number 163. And again as potential 10:40:02 1 2 hardship, and maybe this is somebody we need to bring in, but 3 this gentleman indicates that he had a severe traumatic brain injury a few years ago and that it would affect his ability to 4 10:40:19 read and understand. He also indicates he lost significant 6 parts of his memory, including his short-term memory. And 7 that is in response to question 35. 8 THE COURT: Where's the reference to short-term 9 memory? 10:40:58 10 MR. ROGERS: I wrote in my notes question 35. I may 11 have been mistaken. 12 MR. O'CONNOR: I think he's talking about someone who -- he was a witness in a suit against a healthcare 13 provider. 14 10:41:11 15 THE COURT: Well, he says he has a permanent memory 16 loss in 35, but I don't see a reference to short-term memory. 17 That was my question. MR. ROGERS: Well, Your Honor -- well, I guess what I 18 was referring to, there is question number 2 where he said "I 19 10:41:34 20 had a severe traumatic brain injury a couple of years back which affects short-term memory." 21 22 He doesn't necessarily say he has that, but that's 23 what I was referring to. 24 THE COURT: I see. Okay. 10:41:46 25 Your thoughts, Mr. O'Connor?

10:41:51 1 MR. O'CONNOR: No, I do see that now. I read the 2 other question differently and thought he was trying to 3 describe a lawsuit. 4 I don't know what to say. I mean, obviously that 10:42:05 5 would be a problem if he came and told us. I think that would 6 be a hardship. But he was able to complete this questionnaire 7 fairly thoroughly, and he certainly didn't ask to be excused 8 because of that. 9 I do share the concern on other side, though. I 10:42:21 10 think we certainly want people that are going to be able to 11 perceive and understand the evidence and recall what was 12 presented. Well, we want them to recall what we said not what the defense said. But recall will be important to us. 13 We would not object if you wanted to excuse him for 14 hardship, Your Honor. 10:42:45 15 16 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to do that. 17 going to do it because he says that the traumatic brain injury was four years ago and affects -- he says "affects," he 18 doesn't say "affected" -- affects short-term memory. This is 19 a case that's going to require lots of short-term memory as 10:43:00 20 21 well as put stress on the jurors, so I think we should excuse 2.2 Juror 163. 23 Is that all of them, Mr. Rogers? 24 MR. ROGERS: Yes, Your Honor. 10:43:12 25 THE COURT: Subject, then, to the ones that we're

still reviewing, the jurors that we're going to -- where I've 10:43:14 1 2 granted challenges for cause are Jurors 9, 40, 49, 61, 66, 78, 3 146, 63, 80, 199, 118, and 163. 4 Does that look right, Traci? 10:43:43 5 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes, sir. 6 THE COURT: So we will add those to the folks we've 7 already excused for hardship. We will not have them come in 8 on the 18th for jury selection. 9 In our previous two bellwether trials we have had 60 jurors come in and we've never gotten to 50 in our jury 10:44:08 10 11 selection. There's a cost involved in bringing in jurors we 12 don't need. So I'm inclined to have 50 appear because we've made it pretty comfortably with 50 the last two times. But 13 I'm interested in your thoughts whether you're comfortable 14 with that or whether you still think we need to bring in 55 or 10:44:31 15 16 60. 17 MR. LOPEZ: Could we have two minutes? 18 THE COURT: Sure. 19 MR. O'CONNOR: I'm willing to turn it over to 10:45:07 20 Mr. Lopez, Your Honor. 21 MR. LOPEZ: Based on history, we've never lost a 22 juror either, Judge. We have three extras in case we lose 23 three. So maybe the safe thing to do, if we're going to go 24 down to 50, maybe we only have eight jurors. 10:45:28 25 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I disagree. I think we've

done fine with nine and I don't really know why bringing in of the entire panel really affects number of jurors we seat. I don't see the connection there, really.

But if Your Honor wants to bring in 50, we're fine with that.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I really err on the side of caution when it comes to the number of jurors. I have had the experience of losing a juror a week to cause. Since this is a three-week trial, that's why I picked three additional jurors.

Why don't we bring in 55, Traci. That will save us a little money in jury funds yet still give us a margin of comfort.

So we'll have 55 jurors appear on the 18th for jury selection.

Please remember, Counsel, that you need to get to
Nancy, she'll be back by then, the witness list in a form that
we can hand it out to the jurors in the jury room on the
morning they appear. So please be sure to get that to us,
let's say by noon on September 14th. So by noon a week from
tomorrow. That way there will be plenty of time to copy it
and have it down to the jury office on the 17th so they can
hand it out on the morning of the 18th.

We handed out the voir dire questions to you.

They're very generic. I took out of them the FDA questions

10:47:21 1 that we asked in the Booker trial because we put those into 2 the questionnaire. 3 4 10:47:34 look over those. 6 7 8 suggestions that you have. 10:47:47 10 11 12 13 14 10:48:09 15 the 18th. 16 17 18 19 10:48:29 20 21 2.2 peremptory challenges per side. 23 24 MR. ROGERS: No, Your Honor. 10:48:49 25 MR. O'CONNOR: I'm just looking at -- no other

So they're just the very generic kinds of questions that we asked to see if any other issues have come up. If there are additional voir dire questions you think should be asked, please be prepared to address those when we start at 8:30 on the 18th and I'll be happy to hear any I've also given you preliminary jury instructions. They're also very generic. Although the second one is a brief description of the case that I've modified to reflect the nature of this case. So look over that and see if you have any concerns, and we can hear those as well on the morning of And we'll follow the same jury selection practices we had before: We'll seat all 55 jurors in order. I'll ask my general voir dire questions. We'll then give plaintiff a chance for follow up and defense a chance for follow up. And then we'll excuse the jurors, hear challenges for cause, and then have you exercise your peremptory -- your three Any questions on jury selection? Or issues?

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questions. When you're ready, I think we can make a record on the other -- on the other questionnaires.

THE COURT: Oh. Let's go ahead and do that now.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, number 35 is the one that we would move for cause on. And just quickly going through this, her response to number 36 she ranks us low, but I thought — in response to question 39, the question is, is there anything in this that causes you to believe you could not consider the evidence clearly? And she let's us know that her mother's a high-risk cardiac patient and she's also a Banner Health employee.

She thinks there's too many lawsuits in response to other questions. And then at the end she again has alerted us as to reasons why she can't be fair and impartial. Due to her current lifestyle she has a soft spot for elderly people.

Granted, I don't think that's directly relevant here, but what is important is that she's already telling us she can't be fair and impartial.

And then in response to 64 she made it a point to tell us that she works in a healthcare facility. She gets told stories all the time from patients.

And so it seems to me that just on its face this is a potential juror who is telling us that her life experiences and what she's learned is going to cause her difficulty to be fair and impartial in this case.

10:50:54 1 THE COURT: All right. Mr. O'Connor, you have my 2 copy. Could you bring that up with the other three as well, 3 please. MR. O'CONNOR: Sure. 10:51:02 5 That's number 35. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Rogers. 7 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, we agree. This juror is a 8 little bit of a mixed bag, but she does indicate some biases. 9 And in response to 41 she also says she may -- she doesn't really answer the question regarding bias, but she 10:51:47 10 11 says she has heard something about Bard and indicates she had 12 a patient, slash, friend, who had dislikes about Bard products 13 from her previous surgeries. She doesn't indicate what those are. But I agree, Your Honor, she probably is showing some 14 biases and ought to be struck. 10:52:04 15 16 THE COURT: She also says in her questionnaire, I 17 noticed this when I looked at it, that she could not follow the Court's directions about not communicating on social media 18 19 regarding the case. I'm going to grant the challenge for cause to Juror 10:52:19 20 35. 21 22 That means that Jurors 21, 42, and 144 will be added 23 to the list of jurors from whom we will bring in the 55 on the 24 18th. 10:52:38 25 MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, I'm just reminded, we left

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our Post-its on your copies.
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                        THE COURT: Would you like them back?
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: I think -- I'll come up and remove
              them for you.
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                        THE COURT: They're fine. We'll throw them away.
              Unless you need them for some purpose.
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                        MR. O'CONNOR: I'm sorry?
                        THE COURT: So we'll add Juror 35 to the list of
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               jurors who will not be brought in.
                        MR. O'CONNOR: Again, Your Honor, can you repeat the
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               number?
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                       MS. REED ZAIC: 35?
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                        THE COURT: 35.
                       MS. REED ZAIC: I thought you said 144.
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                       MR. LOPEZ: I missed the three that you said were
               remaining, Judge.
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                        THE COURT: The ones who are remaining, of the new,
              are Jurors 21, 42, and 144.
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                       MS. REED ZAIC: That's it. Okay.
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                        THE COURT: So we'll take the 55 lowest numbers that
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               remain and those will be the folks who will be asked to come
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               in on the 18th for jury selection.
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                        For purposes of trial, as we've discussed, we'll
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               start on the 18th. We'll get the jury chosen by some point in
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              the noon hour. So we should be able, after the lunch break,
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to go right into openings and evidence. We'll plan to go to 10:53:56 1 2 4:30 that day. 3 We'll be in trial on the 19th, 20th, and 21st. 4 We've agreed on Monday the 24th we will start in the 5 afternoon, so we'll start at 1 p.m. on the 24th. 10:54:11 6 Does that work for you, Mr. Lopez? 7 MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And we will then be in trial on the 25th 9 through the 28th. And on August 1st through the 5th. 10:54:27 10 October. We've allocated 33 hours to plaintiff and 30 hours to 11 defense. That was in Docket 11871. 12 13 As you've seen from my order, I've concluded that we should bifurcate punitive damages as we did in the earlier two 14 10:54:48 15 trials. 16 By my count, if each side reserves an hour for the 17 punitive damages phase, then we should get this case to the jury on the morning of October 4th, Thursday. We might even 18 conclude closings on the afternoon of October 3rd. And I 19 10:55:07 20 think that's good. That gives us a couple days both for jury deliberations and for the punitive presentation. 21 22 So that's the schedule we'll follow in the case. And 23 I'll plan, as we have in the past, to go until probably 4:30 24 on the days I can. I have -- I've already scheduled hearings 10:55:27 25 every day in the trial at 4:30, so there may be a day or two

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where we have to break a few minutes early if there's something I need to do to prepare for one of those hearings.

I will give you, as I have in the past, my prelim- -I'm sorry, my proposed final jury instructions early in the
trial. If I can get them done next week I'll get them to you.
Although, looking at next week, I'm not sure I'll be able to
do that. In any event we'll get them to you during the first
week of the trial.

I was told this morning that I have received 22 depositions from you all in the last two days. Is that right?

MR. LOPEZ: Sounds about right. Having reviewed -- been involved in the process, that sounds about right.

THE COURT: I would be thinking we'd be reducing the number of depositions I have to review as we go through these bellwethers.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, the numbers are the same, but -we'll probably have to meet and confer based on some of the
rulings we've seen on others because of Wisconsin law and the
effect of the MSJ on failure to warn.

If you recall, we just went through previously ruled on and designated to see if we had any objections based on the failure to warn MSJ ruling and Wisconsin law, and then you granted us leave to go back on some.

We didn't -- neither side, I think, abused that. We were very selective about additional questions in a number of

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those.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HELM: Your Honor, I just wanted to reiterate many of those it's four, five pages. So you didn't get 22 complete depositions to have to review again.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I will do my best to get through those soon, but given my schedule over the next week, there may be some of those you don't get my rulings on until late next week or even the weekend after this.

I've got some plane time on Wednesday going to DC that I might be able to get the rest of them done, but I just don't know. So I'll do my best to get them out, but some of these might come in pretty close to the start of trial.

MR. LOPEZ: I think knowing that, and knowing that sometimes we ask for -- we did this before. We've got a sense of where the Court was going on some of these things. And certainly by the time we get to trial, we don't play -- we just want to make sure we have your rulings in case we take stuff out and what we do.

I will tell this the Court this: Since we're putting that evidence on first, we'll commit to looking at those depositions and getting to the Court probably pared down versions of those based on what I think -- stuff I think we probably need to take out based on your rulings, or maybe leave in.

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THE COURT: Are you talking, Mr. Lopez, about the 22 received today? Do you want to take another pass through them?

MR. LOPEZ: No. I'm just trying to accommodate the Court more than anything else. I'm not sure -- that might be an effort not worth doing because --

and all day Saturday, but I'm going to have some breaks and I intend to start then. I'm just going to load them all on my iPad and start churning through them. So I'd say don't -- I appreciate the suggestion, but I don't know when I'm going to get to them so I'll just start as soon as I can and I would say you shouldn't redo them.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Let's talk about the motions in limine.

I've been through all of the motions in limine and I can get you my ruling on those probably today. There's one that I wanted to talk through with and you, and if you have others you want to make additional argument on I'll be happy to let you do that, and that's defense Motion in Limine Number 5 with respect to Dr. Kandarpa.

I've read both sides' briefs. I want to explain to you my thinking on this so you can point out where you disagree.

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Here -- here's my view. Dr. Kandarpa is a fact witness in this case. He's not been designated as an expert. There was no expert report given.

I didn't allow him in the first two trials because of nondisclosure, but I concluded the prejudice from that can be cured for this trial so I've allowed him as a fact witness for this trial.

The issue that is addressed in the motion in limine arises only to the extent that Dr. Kandarpa gives opinion testimony. He can testify as a fact witness without any Rule 701 or 702 concerns.

He can give opinion testimony only under Rule 701 as a lay witness. He can't give opinion testimony under Rule 702 because he's not a designated expert in the case and has not been identified as an expert.

Rule 701 says that a lay witness can give opinion testimony but not if the opinion is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

So even if there's a factual basis and there's a perception and 701 is otherwise satisfied, the opinion can't be given under 701(c) if it is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

The line between lay opinion testimony and testimony covered by Rule 701(c) can sometimes be very difficult to

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draw, in my experience.

The Ninth Circuit has said in a decision last year, United States versus Barragan, B-A-R-R-A-G-A-N, 871 F.3d 689 at page 704 that "The line between lay and expert opinion depends on the basis of the opinion not its subject matter." That's all they say. You can read the rest of the case and there's no more illumination than that.

That helps a little bit, but here's the difficulty. Let's say a witness, Dr. Kandarpa, makes statement expressing his viewpoint or his opinion during the deposition that is based in part on what he heard and saw and did in the EVEREST study and in part upon his specialized knowledge as a doctor. Is that a lay opinion or is that an expert opinion?

I don't know any clear line you can articulate on that in the absence of actually looking at the question and making the best judgments.

So my view is that what I need to do with respect to Dr. Kandarpa is rule question by question on whether I think an answer is a 701(c) opinion that is inadmissible or a 701(a) and (b) opinion that is admissible.

I will tell you the thinking I will go through on that question. When I look at a question I'm going to ask three things: Number one, is it an opinion. If it's not, it's okay.

Number two, is it based on his work in the EVEREST

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study or on his specialized knowledge as a doctor?

And number three, I'll look at the context to try to answer that question.

And where I see a question or an answer, an opinion that is based in part on his work in EVEREST and part on his role as a doctor, I'm just going to have to make my best judgment as to whether I think that is a legitimate lay opinion or expert opinion.

That's the way I think I need to approach it and just do it question by question. But I'm interested in your thoughts on whether any of you see it differently.

MR. LERNER: Your Honor, do you want me at the podium?

THE COURT: Yeah, please, so everybody can hear you.

MR. LERNER: Your Honor, I agree with you.

Dr. Kandarpa is one of the depositions we submitted to you. I think there's some questions in there that are clearly opinion related and things that he had an opinion about before the EVEREST study that's unrelated to the EVEREST study, and then there's opinions that he's offering that are not just based on facts or observations from that study that I think you just have to make a ball-and-strike call on.

I will note that sometimes I think the plaintiffs were thinking about this and sometimes in their questioning they would ask the question as a medical monitor and ask the

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question as if it was not opinion based. So -- trying to get over this hurdle.

So when you're reviewing that deposition, I think the fact that they asked the question that says as a medical monitor, X, Y, Z, it still may be something that calls for expert opinions and that was not disclosed to us.

But I agree with your overall assessment. It's going to be ball and strike, question by question.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Lopez.

MR. LOPEZ: I understand the struggle between those sections in 701. I did point out, however, I think I gave you the testimony that for the most part I think he was testifying about his observations as the medical monitor in the EVEREST study. I think where it gets difficult is if he answers a question based on EVEREST, he's doing that as a person hired by Bard because of his credentials and expertise. So I'm not sure how you parse that out. I don't know that you can. I don't know that it's fair that you do if in fact his opinions or his statements about the EVEREST study are based on the fact that he is this highly qualified interventional radiologist who was hired by Bard to adjudicate those adverse events.

The other thing, Your Honor, I just -- again, I'm mindful of the fact that we've had a number of other witnesses

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who were not Rule 26 experts. Dr. Trerotola is one that comes to mind. You'll see we submitted some additional objections to his deposition testimony and ask you to actually add some testimony to it. There are opinion testimonies throughout that deposition designation by the defense. And same with Dr. DeFord.

So I just bring that to the Court's attention because there have been some exceptions to someone rendering opinions even though they haven't been designated as Rule 26 experts nor have they provided a report, but because of their special relationship with Bard or the issues that are related to their testimony, the Court has in fact allowed a lot of what I — certainly the plaintiffs would consider expert testimony by at least those two. I'm sure I could think of others. But those are two depositions I happened to work on so I know about those two right now.

But I understood the rules and I understand the evidence that applies to these. But I also wanted to bring to the Court's attention the special relationship with Bard and how — one more point I wanted to make, Your Honor, is sometimes opinions that he might have that he expressed are opinions — our position's going to be maybe these are conversations that Bard should have had with Dr. Kandarpa when he was in that role and these are opinions he would have rendered to them or did. And they should have been mindful of

his opinions as the medical monitor based on his expertise when they made certain decisions and representations to the FDA, doctors, patients, et cetera.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I'm understanding your last point, Mr. Lopez.

MR. LOPEZ: Well, if Dr. Kandarpa has opinions about what was going on, I mean some of the opinions you're talking about were opinions that Bard had an opportunity to obtain from someone like him before they submitted their final report on EVEREST, before they decided to make certain decisions about the continuing marketing of the G2 device without maybe changing the warnings, making design changes.

So I think his opinions is in his capacity as an agent at the time, and certainly he was an expert to them, about what his -- what advice he would have given to Bard had they asked. That's -- I think that's relevant in the case.

Just like what Dr. Trerotola says about in his opinions with respect to his experience in working with Bard, with those devices, in particular the G2 device, him making a statement that the medical community considered the Simon Nitinol filter the Simon frightenol filter. Those are expert opinions in addition to hearsay.

But I think there is another issue here with respect to Dr. Kandarpa's special role and relationship, not just to the EVEREST study as a study, but to the patients and the

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risks and complications of those patients and the kind of advice they could have received from Dr. Kandarpa about that had they asked. And the opinions that he renders, I think. I think you're talking about opinions he's rendering, isn't that something doctors should have known.

Certainly our position's going to be why didn't you ask Dr. Kandarpa about that while you had access to him, who was the person who that the most and the best knowledge about what was going on with that patient population.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOPEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Lerner.

MR. LERNER: Your Honor, Dr. Kandarpa's role was to adjudicate whether something was a complication or not. So to the extent he's offering opinions, they asked questions about does that relate to the brochures or this cascade theory they developed. Those are all opinion related things. If they wanted to disclose him as an expert, they had a disclosure requirement or report requirement.

So I think it all goes back to what you said earlier. Question by — question by question analysis. But he's there to testify about his facts, his observations, what he saw, the documents that he submitted. Those sorts of things. But there's a lot of things here that go beyond those things that are really opinion related and that, given the disclosure

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requirement, report requirements, they should have been disclosed if they were going to offer those opinions.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

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You know, there's a second issue that I've wrestled with and I'll mention to you just so I can get the benefit of your thinking. One question that I just tried to outline is what do you do when an expression of opinion is based in part on what Dr. Kandarpa saw or heard or did in the EVEREST study and in part on his expertise as a doctor.

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There's another line that's been drawn in some of the cases on expert disclosure. It's a line that's drawn, used to be drawn, when dealing with Rule 26 disclosures before Rule 26(a)(2)(C) was added, which is the obligation of a lawyer to disclose expert opinions that don't have to be in an expert

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report.

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So cases that were dealing with the question of what has to be in an expert report before there was an (a)(2)(C), including the Goodman case in the Ninth Circuit, drew the line between an opinion that was formed by a doctor in the course of treatment and an opinion that was not formed in the course of treatment, that was developed later.

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The example being if a doctor, you know, who was caring for a cancer patient developed the opinion in the care that the patient had five years to live, that would be an opinion developed as part of his care of the patient. And if

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there's a trial later and the doctor adds an opinion that the cancer was caused by exposure to a particular substance, an opinion that was not formed during the course of treatment but was a causation type opinion. The way the courts dealt with that is that the opinion formed after the treatment or independent of the treatment had to be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) in an expert report. The opinion formed during the treatment didn't have to be because it was part of the treatment.

Now, that was a Rule 26 way of thinking of things.

But I suppose in a case like this you could say that opinions Dr. Kandarpa formed during and as a result of his involvement in the EVEREST trial are facts related to the EVEREST trial. It's an opinion he developed that is now a fact of something that arose from the EVEREST trial and is not really the expression of a new opinion.

Whereas an opinion that he states in the deposition that didn't arise from his involvement in the EVEREST trial is an expert opinion under Rule 702.

It's another place to draw the line. It's imperfect for a number of reasons. But I'm just interested in any thoughts you all have on that question.

MR. LERNER: Your Honor, when I was looking at this I was looking at your standing order in the *Goodman* case as well, and I thought that with the new requirement we can do

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disclosures that you don't need a report that the distinction was under Ninth Circuit law, the *Goodman* case, was that if you had opinions formed during the course of treatment, maybe during the EVEREST study, that requires a full expert report. And then opinions formed —— I'm sorry. Opinions formed during the course of treatment or during the EVEREST study is ones you do disclosures. Opinions that are formed outside of the EVEREST study, like outside of a treatment, that's when you need the full report.

So I was thinking along the same lines that that's how you distinguish those.

EVEREST study, if you make that analogy to a treating physician, you would have to do disclosure. So when we took the deposition, we're preparing for the deposition, we know the summary of his opinions and basis and we can test those and don't have to do it on the fly, and then we can analyze Daubert challenges, see if we have to file a Daubert motion. Here we didn't have that opportunity. There's no disclosure either way about the opinions that were going to be offered.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, I think we were very careful in that deposition when we asked him questions about whether or not this was based on his observations as the medical monitor and the facts as related to his role as the medical monitor in the EVEREST trial. Not, you know, based on what

you've heard since and based on other facts after that time 11:15:38 1 period and his state of mind as it existed at that time. We 2 3 made it clear this was based on those facts as they existed and where his mind was at that time and not something that 5 would have transpired after that. 11:15:54 6 THE COURT: All right. Thanks for your comments. 7 The Kandarpa deposition transcript that came in I 8 deleted because you called and said don't use it. 9 MR. LOPEZ: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that. 11:16:09 10 THE COURT: I deleted the deposition transcript 11 because there was a call to our office saying don't rule on 12 this, we're still working on an issue. So I don't have the transcript you all previously submitted. 13 MS. HELM: It's actually been resubmitted, Your 14 11:16:21 15 Honor. 16 THE COURT: In the last couple days? 17 MS. HELM: If you'll give me a minute, I'll search and find when we sent it, but it definitely was resubmitted. 18 THE COURT: All right. It's not in the list of the 19 11:16:33 20 22 depositions that we counted this morning in our e-mails. 21 MS. HELM: It came in before those. But, Your Honor, 22 I'll find it and resend it to Nancy's e-mail. 23 THE COURT: No. Send it to Jeff's e-mail. Nancy's 24 not in town and she has 4,000 e-mails in her inbox right now. 11:16:52 25 We'll never find it.

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                       MS. HELM: Okay. I will find it and make sure I
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              e-mail it to Jeff.
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                       THE COURT: Okay. I will think about what you've all
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              said and go through and rule question by question.
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                       MR. LOPEZ: I was going to say don't make that number
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              23, Judge. Move those down and make Kandarpa maybe one, two,
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              or three on the list you go through.
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                        THE COURT: Because he's earlier in your
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              presentation?
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                       MR. LOPEZ: He will be. Plus it's the subject of a
              motion anyway. You'll probably do that anyway.
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                       THE COURT: Well, do you need him earlier?
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                       MR. LOPEZ: Yes.
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                       THE COURT: Okay. I'll try to get to him earlier.
                       Okay. As I mentioned, I've been through all of the
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              other motions in limine. Do plaintiffs want to make arguments
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              on any of those other motions that have been submitted?
                       MS. REED ZAIC: Actually, it was in opposition to
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              defendants' motions, so I don't know that I should have jumped
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              up first. It's not our motion. The opposition to the
              cephalad migration evidence. I wanted to make a comment --
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                       THE COURT: That's fine. Yeah, that's fine.
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                       MS. REED ZAIC: I'm not trying to be psychic, but I
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              did notice in a ruling on a particular transcript you
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              indicated that the Court seems to be leaning towards excluding
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the Recovery death migration evidence because there is an issue whether this was an Eclipse.

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I just wanted to add comment, Your Honor, that in our motion opposing the Recovery migration death evidence I pointed out that we absolutely understood the Court's admonitions in the Booker trial to not run away with that evidence and we were very, very specific starting from opening with regard to the design of the filter our position that it's extremely important for us to be able to present to the jury why the redesign from Recovery to the G2 filter took place. And we were very careful to limit the evidence to that in presenting it to the jury.

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And the reason why it's particularly important in this case is that we have to provide the -- presumably we will have to provide some basis for feasibility. Some sort of argument about the feasibility. And there was an immediate reaction when it came to what was happening publicly regarding the migration deaths and the timing of which they ran back to the table to redesign, as opposed to later on with the G2 filter the argument from the defendants seems to be that these were asymptomatic. There was not this public outpouring and knowledge of resistance to using the product.

So in presenting our ability -- their ability to sit down and redesign a filter quickly, that's a key piece of evidence. Again, understanding the Court's admonition that

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we're not to run away with that evidence.

I just wanted to make that additional comment or argument. And I'm taking advantage of I got a preview --

THE COURT: Right. Let me ask you a question on that point, Ms. Reed Zaic, because I saw that argument in your brief.

I understood you to be saying that it's going to be important for you to be able to tell the jury that this company can act quickly and make changes to filters when it's motivated to do so.

MS. REED ZAIC: Can act quickly, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If I were to stand by my ruling on cephalad death evidence, there is nothing that would preclude you from putting in evidence that Bard acted quickly to put the G2 on the market when the Recovery filter problems were known. You could still show that within nine months it had something on the market and therefore has the ability to be nimble and quick when it wants to do so, to make the very same point that it's not true that it takes years and years to develop a filter. What is your thought on that?

MS. REED ZAIC: My thought on that is, again, because it was public, because these deaths were -- pardon me.

Because this was a public issue that they were reacting to, they were motivated. Right? It goes to their conduct. They were motivated to sit down more quickly when it's a death.

Right now what would be presented -- first of all, 11:21:02 1 2 there's evidence we wouldn't be able to put in front of the 3 jury at all regarding their ability, not only the feasibility 4 that their redesign but their conduct in we treat this situation completely different. 5 11:21:12 6 Although people can die from G2 related injuries and 7 complications, in the moment when it was apparent and a public 8 communications risk with their company, that's what drove them 9 to sit down and redesign. And whereas they didn't have that 11:21:29 10 second -- that scenario the second time around, they didn't 11 run back and redesign it. 12 I think that it's an issue of it not being complete 13 if I've got redacted statements about injuries and pointing out this happened before they were able to sit down. 14 gravitas of it with regard to Bard's conduct is not going to 11:21:44 15 16 be clear to the jury. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. Defense counsel, do you have points you 18 want to make on any of the motions in limine? 19 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I believe Mr. North is going 11:22:13 20 to address Ms. Zaic's comments. 21 22 THE COURT: That's fine. 23 MR. NORTH: Your Honor, I would just point out 24 briefly that there's nothing in this Court's previous ruling 11:22:25 25 in Jones that precluded the plaintiffs from introducing

evidence that the Recovery filter did have reports of 11:22:29 1 2 migration and did have reports of fracture. The complication evidence was allowed to go in. It was merely the inflammatory 3 4 and prejudicial evidence about the deaths themselves that did 11:22:45 not go in. 6 But they can make the point that Ms. Zaic is saying 7 they need to make by pointing out that we acted quickly when 8 there were reports of complications of fracture and of migration. 11:22:59 10 I would also note, Your Honor, that this particular 11 instance in Hyde is very different from what the Court faced 12 in Booker because of the date of implant. 13 Ms. Booker's implant was 2006, only a year or so after the G2 had been placed in the market. Ms. Hyde's 14 implant was Feb -- yeah, February of 2011. And so the 11:23:18 15 16 Recovery filter migration death evidence is extremely remote 17 to any of the issues relevant to Ms. Hyde's claim. And for that reason, we would ask the Court to adhere to the ruling in 18 19 Jones. 11:23:37 20 THE COURT: Okay. I understand the parties' views on that issue. 21 22 I will get you a decision on the non-Kandarpa motions 23 in limine today, I'm pretty confident. Tomorrow in any event. 24 All right. Let's talk about matters that are raised 11:24:07 25 in the final pretrial order. I went through it. There's

11:24:11 1 several issues I wanted to take up with you. 2 First, a procedural question. Do you want me to read 3 to the jury, as I think I did before, the stipulations that are contained on pages 4 and 5 of your final pretrial order? 11:24:43 5 MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, the defendants would agree to that. 6 7 THE COURT: So what I'm referring to specifically are 8 the stipulations in section C(1)(a) through (1) that's on 9 pages 4 and 5. 11:25:24 10 MR. O'CONNOR: That's fine. Through (1) you said; is 11 that right, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: Yeah, through (1). 13 MR. O'CONNOR: We have no objection. THE COURT: Okay. I will read those stipulations, 14 then, before the openings. 11:25:35 15 It seems to me, as I do read that, that I ought to 16 17 read the footnote on page 4 about the fact that there's a disagreement on whether this is a G2X or Eclipse so the jury 18 understands that going in. And I'd just read that as part of 19 the sentence on paragraph (1)(b). Does that make sense to you 11:26:15 20 all? 21 22 MR. ROGERS: Yes, Your Honor. 23 MR. O'CONNOR: That makes sense to us, Your Honor. 24 MR. LOPEZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I'm reading (1). 11:26:51 25 I'm thinking ahead to evidence and argument under (1)(1).

Dr. Kuo actually calls that a complex removal process. 11:26:59 1 2 use of the word "percutaneous" has some significance in this 3 case because certainly the patient brochure and things like that use the term "percutaneous procedure." That simply means 11:27:21 he didn't have to open up her chest. But that doesn't mean 6 this device was removed in the manner in which Bard had 7 represented and which --THE COURT: Well, why don't I -- Mr. Lopez, why don't 8 9 I just take out the last four words of that sentence and say Dr. William Kuo removed the filter and fractured strut. 11:27:35 10 MR. LOPEZ: That's fine. That works. 11 12 THE COURT: That's the fact that needs to be told to 13 the jury. 14 Is that all right? 11:27:46 15 MR. ROGERS: That's fine, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. The next question I wanted to 17 ask is on page 8 of the final pretrial order where the defendants raise an argument -- they actually raise it on page 18 It's actually over on page 10 -- that the negligence per 19 11:28:19 20 se claim in this case is preempted under the Buckman case. 21 There's a lot of briefing on that in the final 22 pretrial order. I guess my question is what do you want me to 23 do with it? Do you want me to rule on that before trial? 24 It wasn't brought in a motion for summary judgment. 11:28:51 25 But if I were to agree with it, it would presumably save some

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trial time because I assume there's an expert who's going to testify about how the actions did not comply with certain federal statutes and regulations.

So I guess my thought has been if that's an argument that's going to be made in a Rule 50 motion at the close of plaintiffs' case, and if I were to agree with it, then the plaintiffs would have wasted several hours on it.

So do you want me to rule on that before the start of trial? That's really the question I have.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, the defendants would. And we did not move on it at summary judgment, you're correct about that, and -- but we did not know until we got the proposed pretrial order from plaintiffs exactly what the underlying bases for their negligence per se claim was. And when we did receive that, we learned that there were nothing but the federal statutes and regulations that relate to the FDA. And so hence we put the negligence per se arguments into the pretrial order. So I do think it would be helpful if the Court ruled on that prior to trial.

MR. O'CONNOR: Your Honor, this was Mr. Goldenberg's issue, but I have -- do you want to go ahead -- are we in agreement?

MR. GOLDENBERG: Your Honor, I think it would be very helpful for you to rule on this before. I think, again, we feel confident in what our argument is, but I think everybody

should know this just because I think it will help streamline 11:30:20 1 2 the trial and also make sure that we're much more efficient as 3 to how we present evidence. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 11:30:31 5 MR. LOPEZ: One more point. This also includes lay 6 witnesses. There's a number -- in fact, the depositions we're 7 going to read where we ask questions about federal regulations 8 of even corporate witnesses, so I would just echo the thought we'd like --THE COURT: All the more reason. Okay. 11:30:46 10 11 I will get you a ruling on this issue based on the 12 briefing that's here as soon as we can. By the middle of next week, I think. 13 All right. On page 45 of the final pretrial order, 14 defendants request that each side notify the other 48 hours in 11:31:06 15 16 advance as to who live witnesses will be and 24 hours in 17 advance regarding deposition designations. Ms. Helm. 18 MS. HELM: We've actually reached an agreement on 19 that this morning, Your Honor. 11:31:26 20 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MS. HELM: Mr. O'Connor and I --23 THE COURT: That's what you've agreed to? 24 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. 11:31:31 25 THE COURT: Okay. So as in the prior -- is that

11:31:33 1 right, Mr. O'Connor? 2 MR. O'CONNOR: That's correct, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So as in the prior trial, be sure 4 to give the other side 48 hours advance notice on live 11:31:42 witnesses, 24 hours advance notice on deposition portions that are going to be played. 6 7 MS. HELM: Your Honor, we actually also agreed to 24 8 hours notice on exhibits for witnesses. For any witness being played the next day. THE COURT: Okay. 11:31:56 10 11 MS. HELM: Presented the next day. 12 MR. O'CONNOR: Well, we didn't -- I don't -- are we 13 in agreement with that? MR. LOPEZ: Well, I mean, the practice has been we've 14 said that, but both sides, because of how busy we are, usually 11:32:09 15 16 doesn't happen 24 hours, it happens the night before. So I 17 don't want to be stuck with that rule and have it -- have you rule we can't use a document because of it. Because I know 18 from the practice of the past two trials we've said 24 hours 19 and we're both sending documents to each other at 1 o'clock in 11:32:27 20 the morning, which is about eight or nine hours before we 21 22 actually put on a witness. 23 THE COURT: Ms. Helm. 24 MS. HELM: Your Honor, I think both sides can use our 11:32:40 25 best efforts to get as much possible 24 hours -- as I recall

last time we talked about this, you said I'm not going to 11:32:44 1 2 exclude an exhibit because you thought of it at 1:00 in the 3 morning. So I'm in agreement with that, but I do think it 11:32:53 5 would be beneficial for everyone to exchange as much as we possibly can. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. Best efforts. But hard 8 deadline by 1:00 a.m. 9 MS. HELM: Thank you, Your Honor. 11:33:05 10 THE COURT: I can't believe I really said that. 11 Next issue is Dr. Asch, which is on page 45 and 46. 12 I had indicated when I got to his deposition --13 actually his trial testimony late at night that I thought it was well-taken, but I realized later I hadn't even looked at 14 Rule 804, I looked at only Rule 801. So I wanted to hear more 11:33:30 15 16 on it today. And then defendants filed a brief on it last 17 night about why Dr. Asch's previous trial testimony is usable in this trial. So I know what defendants' positions are on 18 that issue. 19 Plaintiffs' counsel, do you want to respond? 11:33:51 20 MR. LOPEZ: Okay. I think I'm going to go through 21 22 the elements, Your Honor, and deal with them one at a time. 23 Let's deal with unavailability issue. 24 Obviously he is unavailable because he's outside of 11:34:20 25 the subpoena power of the court. In fact, not even in this

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I want to talk about the reasonable means to procure attendance. When we first rendered this objection when counsel, defense, designated his trial testimony, we told them that we don't intend to call him live, but feel free to call Dr. Asch yourself, and I think we may have even provided the contact information for him. So they had — they could have called him and procured his attendance here.

All they're saying is we didn't agree to produce him. He's not our expert. He's a fact witness. So I don't know what, really, efforts -- what reasonable means, maybe counsel for defense can address this, they made to see if Dr. Asch could actually be here.

For a number of reasons, we're going to play his deposition instead of calling him live. Some of it has to do with time factors and some of it has to do with the fact we're going to be more limited in what we present with him.

The other element here is the fact that this is being offered against a party who was not a predecessor in interest under the code. In other words -- I didn't say that right.

The prior depositions, those plaintiffs were not predecessors in interest of Mrs. Hyde. And counsel does cite two Ninth Circuit cases in the brief we got last night, but they're two district court cases, and both involve the same parties, I believe. The other was the use of an MDL

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deposition applicable to cases filed after the depositions.

That's something we had talked about, I think, in one of our first or second CMC's in this MDL. And those parties were allowed an opportunity to redepose.

So neither one of those things really apply here.

Here's the one I think we need to spend some time on, that's the opportunity and motive. I know it would seem that because the same plaintiffs' lawyers with the same device would have the same opportunity and motive, but, in fact, that's not true.

The results -- there were a number of evidentiary things, evidence with respect to NMT, some of the testing, bench testing, Dr. Asch's actions, interactions, with NMT that we simply did not bring up at trial that were not addressed in his deposition that we just didn't because we were counting minutes and wanted to make sure that -- the way we had the case mapped out, we had to leave some of that stuff on the cutting room floor.

This is Wisconsin law. We didn't know at that time whether or not Wisconsin law or Nevada law was going to apply in this case. But for certain it was not going to be Georgia law.

And the difference between Wisconsin law and Georgia law is quite significant from the standpoint we're dealing with a design defect statute here and the design defect

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negligence per se and what the Court has left us and we don't have a failure to warn case.

Another piece of evidence we did not introduce through Dr. Asch were some of the flawed migration resistance testing. We're calling Dr. Parisian in this case. He's going to talk about some of this stuff. We didn't call Dr. Parisian in the last case because we didn't have time to. Now we will be able to do that.

There's Kay Fuller testimony and related exhibits. Failed bench testing compared to the SNF and SIR guidance article rebuttal that we could have put on through Dr. Asch that are going to become more relevant in this case.

The importance of monitoring outside of this retrievability study. That's a big issue here. As you know from some of the filings, even though we don't have a failure to warn case as relates to Dr. Henry, we're saying the company still had the obligation to tell the medical community for other doctors to maybe monitor this device to avoid what happened to Mrs. Hyde.

The deposition -- we took a deposition in this case, Your Honor, so both sides could deal with what the generic issues might be as they relate to Dr. Asch and his study.

Both sides had an equal opportunity to depose

Dr. Asch, cross-examine Dr. Asch, on issues -- and I think

with respect to the deposition, we're offering the deposition

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as testimony.

That deposition — the cross-examination for that deposition happened in the deposition. To allow now for additional testimony beyond deposition testimony that where there's no question, both sides had an opportunity to cross-examine, Mrs. Hyde is bound by that deposition because she was part of the MDL then. She should not be bound by any testimony or cross-examination that was given in a trial where she was not a party or that the party in which it was being rendered is not her predecessor in interest.

So that's the basis of us stating that this trial testimony should not be admitted into this case.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of questions on your argument, Mr. Lopez.

You mentioned that because of time limits in the Jones trial you didn't go into things like bench testing and Kay Fuller --

MR. LOPEZ: Right.

THE COURT: -- testimony.

As I read Rule 804(b)(1)(B), in the -- you have a copy in front of you. In the phrase after the second dash, it says, talking about Ms. Hyde, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.

"It" refers back to testimony in 804(b) and it's the

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testimony being presented.

So as I understand the rule, the question is whether the testimony that Bard would want to present through Dr. Asch was fully developed through direct, cross, or redirect. In other words whether you had an opportunity to address the points Bard wants now to present from that testimony.

I don't think it refers to matters that you may -- different matters that you may have chosen to ask Dr. Asch about but didn't because of time limits.

The question is whether the excerpts they want to present to the jury from Dr. Asch, you had a fair opportunity to develop. And it seems to me you clearly did because you did redirect after Bard did its cross.

MR. LOPEZ: There's one area of the cross and redirect that we did not develop. I wasn't involved in that. I read the testimony, trial transcript pages 326 through 330. There was a sidebar where Mr. North had opened the door to asking Dr. Asch why he stopped the recovery — stopped using the Recovery filter. You allowed Mr. O'Connor to get back up and redirect Dr. Asch about that, who had previously been admonished to not talk about the deaths he heard about, and therefore we never got that testimony from Dr. Asch in that trial.

THE COURT: Which testimony?

MR. LOPEZ: The testimony that you were going to

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allow Dr. Asch to testify to before we could tell him, by the way, that admonition you got about not mentioning because you heard about deaths, you don't have to abide by that any more.

THE COURT: Hold on. I'm confused.

I thought we did abide by that. We did abide by an admonition on deaths. We're talking about the second trial, the Jones trial?

MR. LOPEZ: Right.

THE COURT: So say again --

MR. LOPEZ: Mr. North had asked a question of the witness that on sidebar, and, again, it's trial transcript 326 through 330, had opened the door to now being able to ask questions of Dr. Asch about why he stopped using the Recovery, and his ability to now be able to testify was because of the deaths he heard about.

Well, he didn't know that admonition had been lifted and so we never got that testimony from Dr. Asch.

So I mean that's -- that's just an instance, one instance in the trial where we were not given a fair opportunity to cross-examine or redirect Dr. Asch on, really, a very significant issue in the case.

But I understand what Your Honor's saying. We had — we had opportunities to redirect on some of those issues that they're talking about. But those issues were also covered in a deposition. And I think the defense has to tell us where it

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is, if those are different than the deposition, that we don't have to fight about, we don't have to worry about whether or not these exceptions under 804 and whether or not he's available, not available, or whether or not there's a predecessor in interest here.

And I think what we have here is that maybe he just likes the direct -- the cross he did better in the trial on the same issues.

But I just think in an MDL, in a matter of fairness to all the parties, we all agreed that this deposition of Dr. Asch was going to be the deposition, the generic fact deposition, that applied to all parties.

For us to go back and say what would we have done differently in anticipation of Wisconsin law, in anticipation of Nevada law, in anticipation of maybe having some more time in this case to have more fully developed the testimony surrounding what's being offered, I mean, I listed some.

And so I don't think you can just focus in on just the testimony they're offering. We have to focus in on whether or not as a pred- -- as a -- not as a predecessor in interest, but as the lawyers involved in that with the same motive and opportunity. Did we really have the same motive and opportunity? Because we weren't thinking about Mrs. Hyde's case. We weren't thinking about some of the unique aspects of her case where even one or two or three

questions that relate to that cross-examination might have 11:46:03 1 2 been different. I don't know. I mean I think that's the problem we have is that we 3 could have and we didn't. We were not -- we did not have the same motive and opportunity in a case that involved a 11:46:13 different product, involved a different injury, involved a 6 7 different time period, and, frankly, a different set of 8 evidence with respect to the issues here. And certainly not the same law. THE COURT: Well, let me -- let me ask another 11:46:33 10 11 question that's confusing me now. 12 I just looked back to the transcript that you submitted. It was from the Booker trial. 13 MR. LOPEZ: Okay. Someone put in my notes Jones 14 trial, 326 to 330. 11:46:47 15 THE COURT: The transcript I have that's been 16 17 submitted is from the Booker trial. MS. HELM: Your Honor, we also over the weekend, the 18 18 includes part of the Jones transcript as well. 19 11:47:00 20 THE COURT: Are you proposing to use what's from the Booker trial? 21 22 MS. HELM: Actually, Your Honor, we -- yes. Part of 23 Booker and part of Jones. And we went back and made sure they 24 didn't duplicate each other. 11:47:10 25 THE COURT: But am I to rule on everything, if I

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decide Dr. Asch's testimony can be used, in the Booker
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              transcript you gave me a week and a half ago?
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                        MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor.
                        THE COURT: Okay.
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                        So what you're talking about, then, Mr. Lopez,
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               concerns a new transcript from the Jones trial?
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                        MR. LOPEZ: Yes. I was addressing the Jones -- I
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               should have -- I thought the Court knew they designated both
               Booker and Jones.
                        THE COURT: Well, in Jones you weren't under a
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               limit -- I'm sorry. In Booker you weren't under a limitation
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               not to inquire of Dr. Asch's decision based on death evidence.
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               That was in the trial.
                       MR. LOPEZ: That's true. That's true.
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                        THE COURT: Okay.
                        MR. LOPEZ: Here's the other issue I have here.
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               I'm -- the Ninth Circuit case is the one that really popped
               out at me. That was an MDL deposition that was taken --
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                        THE COURT: What case are you referring to?
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                        MR. LOPEZ: It's in the trial brief. Let's see.
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              Page 2 of their trial brief. I apologize, Your Honor. We got
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              this thing we -- we were doing a lot of other --
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                        THE COURT: There's Hangarter, H-A-N-G-A-R-T-E-R,
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              which is a 2004 Ninth Circuit case cited on page 2. And I
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              think that's the only Ninth Circuit case on this point.
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There's a later one dealing with Rule 32 which is the *Hub* case.

Well, go ahead and make your point.

MR. LOPEZ: That was a case where there was an MDL deposition that was taken. Certainly subsequent plaintiffs that come into that case involving the same law, same venue, same product, same liability case there would seem to be a pretty good argument of motive and opportunity there when someone becomes part of an MDL, but in that case I think the Court allowed a subsequent deposition, an opportunity to redepose after the MDL deposition because someone came on board afterwards.

I just -- the issue here, Your Honor, is do we really have a predecessor in interest here just because these happened to be the plaintiffs in the same -- among 4,000 plaintiffs in an MDL and we're -- I mean, you're asking us to test whether or not we were thinking ahead, even if it's just one or two questions that might deal with that issue. That's why it's unfair.

I just ran through a list of things that we could have explored but didn't explore that may have gone to that issue, the issues that they want to present in their cross-examination of Dr. Asch. Which I will tell you they had a full opportunity to do at the deposition, which is — should be the operative testimony in this case that both sides have

agreed would have in fact applied to Mrs. Hyde. 11:50:43 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks. 3 MR. LOPEZ: The case is H-Y-N-I-X, page 2. The Hynix 4 semiconductor case, Your Honor. 11:51:10 5 THE COURT: I don't -- I see. It's at the bottom. 6 It's not a Ninth Circuit case, it's a Northern District of 7 California case. 8 MR. LOPEZ: Yeah. They cited it. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Defense counsel. 11:51:27 10 MR. LOPEZ: I apologize. I shouldn't have said Ninth 11 Circuit. My notes actually say district court. My notes 12 actually say the Ninth Circuit really hasn't dealt with it. 13 This was a district court case. I didn't want to misrepresent myself to the Court. 14 11:51:40 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. CONDO: Your Honor, good morning. James Condo on 17 behalf of the defendants. My throat is a little raspy this morning. I apologize. I'm sucking a cough drop and I hope I 18 can convey what I need to convey to the Court. 19 11:51:59 20 I wanted to start with the notion of the elements of the Rule 804(b)(1). I believe, as does Your Honor, that the 21 22 literal language of the rule does in fact the analysis to 23 focus on the specific testimony that is being offered and 24 whether or not, in the context of that testimony factually, 11:52:29 25 there was a motive and an opportunity to conduct redirect

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examination in this case because the testimony designated comes from, in part, the cross-examination done by Mr. North in the Jones trial.

Theres was 13 pages of redirect examination in the Jones transcript done by Mr. O'Connor after Mr. North's cross-examination. That was the second time that Dr. Asch has testified on his involvement in the pilot study involving retrievability of the Recovery filter.

There are an identity of issues and there is exactly the same motive and opportunity that existed in Booker and in Jones to develop the very specific testimony that is now being proffered to the Court.

The notion that there needs to be an exact identity or privity in partners — in parties, I think, is still an open question in the Ninth Circuit. The only case that we found was the *Hub* case, which talked about 32(a) in an earlier generation which had the successor in interest language. That language obviously no longer appears in the current version of 32(a) with respect to depositions.

What appears in 804(b)(1), and is the language predecessor in interest.

The so the Court has not rejected -- the Ninth

Circuit has not specifically rejected the notion that you need identity of parties. In fact, what they said was to the contrary, you don't need exactly identical parties and exactly

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identical issues. And they left open the question as to whether or not an advocate, an versus party is sufficient in and of itself to establish that there was motive and opportunity to develop through cross-examination in that case the testimony.

Two later cases that we have found, only one dealing with 804(b)(1), is the Hynix case, the Northern District of California case, excuse me.

That case has, on page 250 FRD 452 page -- I'm sorry. 250 FRD 452 2008, and I think the cite I'm reading from is 77 Federal Rules of Evidence, Service 1, page 5. There is some language which I think is instructive talking specifically about the predecessor in interest language.

They acknowledge that the witness is unavailable and then the court goes on to state there that the modern test does not require privity between the current party and the party who participated in the prior proceeding. A previous party having like motive to develop the testimony about the same material facts is a predecessor in interest to the present party.

Privity is not the gravamen of Rule 804(b)(1).

And that same analysis appears in an opinion from Judge McNamee in this district. Ernest Jackson versus ABC Nissan, Inc., also cited in our trial brief. 2007 Westlaw 274315.

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And there the court is taking up the issue of 32(a), the prior version before it was amended, that contained the successor in interest language. And the court, looking at Hub, quotes from Hub and says the requirements of 32(a) that the present lawsuits involve the same subject matter and same parties or their representatives or successors in interest have been construed liberally in light of the twin goals of fairness and efficiency. Then goes on to quote from Hub the accepted inquiry focuses on whether the prior cross-examination would satisfy a reasonable party who opposes admission.

And that's what we have here, Your Honor. We have 13 pages of redirect examination on the very specific subjects that were raised by Mr. North in the Jones trial.

So we think that there is no Ninth Circuit authority that specifically precludes the utilization of the Jones testimony. We think the Ninth Circuit testimony -- authority that does exist certainly lays the conceptual framework for its admission by looking at the factual context in which it was presented and in which there was an opportunity to cross-examine or redirect the witness, the witness they have now presented twice.

I also think, Your Honor, that there is a more than colorful argument that the residual exception rule applies.

Rule 807. It's not something we cited in our brief, but, as

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Your Honor knows, the residual exception rule says that a hearsay statement is not excluded if it meets certain elements in 807.

It has to have the equivalent circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. I don't think there's any question that that has been demonstrated here. It's a testimony that occurred in this courtroom in front of Your Honor under oath involving qualified trial counsel on both sides.

Clearly the testimony that we are offering is offered as evidence of a material fact. And the testimony from Jones is more probative on the points for which it is offered than any other evidence that we could present.

And, finally, admitting it will best serve the purposes of the rules and the interest of justice, which I think is another coterminous way of saying that you construe the rules liberally in light of the twin goals of fairness and efficiency that the *Hub* court identified.

So we think, Your Honor, all of the elements of 804(b)(1) have been met. The witness is outside the jurisdiction. He's not subject to subpoena power. We're not required to engage in a futile gesture in order to try to serve him with a subpoena in order to demonstrate that.

They are proffering him under 32(a) as an unavailable witness. Presumably he is as unavailable to us as he is to

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them.

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So all of the elements of 32(a)(4), which they are offering this witness under, I think make it clear that if he is unavailable to the plaintiffs, and they need to make the requisite showings that he is unavailable, then he is unavailable to us. They can't subpoena him. We can't subpoena him. They're not bringing him. We asked them to bring him.

He has been under their control and presented twice in this courtroom live in the first two trials. And we think if the elements of 32(a)(4) demonstrate unavailability to justify use of the deposition in this courtroom, then we have demonstrated unavailability as well as our efforts to simply acknowledging the fact that he is outside of the subpoena power of the court in a foreign country, a doctor with a medical practice.

THE COURT: What is your response, Mr. Condo, to Mr. Lopez's argument that you could have called him and asked him to come to trial and therefore had reasonable means to procure his attendance?

MR. CONDO: Well, Your Honor, I think that goes to the 32(a) element of what they are attempting to show. And under 32(a)(1)(C) the use has to be allowed by 32(a)(2) through (a)(8). And 32(a)(4) says that you can use the deposition for any party if the court finds, and then there is

a series of elements. And certainly he's not dead. 12:02:11 1 2 He is more than 100 miles from the place of trial or 3 outside of the United States, unless it appears that the 4 witness's absence was procured by the party offering the 12:02:26 deposition. 6 They brought him twice. 7 His absence, we would submit, is procured by the 8 party purporting to offer the deposition since they have not 9 asked him to come. 12:02:39 10 If they have asked him to come and he can't be here, 11 then our asking him to come to get the same answer's a futile 12 gesture. But presumably, if they're proffering the deposition, they've asked him. He's come twice. And they 13 have procured his absence and intend to offer the deposition. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 12:03:01 15 Mr. Lopez, briefly, please. 16 17 MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, 32 deals with depositions. The issue 18 is not a deposition here. It's 804 that requires reasonable 19 12:03:24 20 means --THE COURT: But -- but the point I think they're 21 22 making is you can't use his deposition unless he's 23 unavailable. So by offering his deposition you're saying he's 24 unavailable. And yet you're arguing for their use he's not 12:03:36 25 unavailable.

12:04:56 25

MR. LOPEZ: Because 804 requires reasonable means to procure his testimony. They're the ones that want to offer the testimony.

Your Honor, I think it's important for you to understand historically what happened here. We advised them a month before trial. More than a month before trial. We listed those new depositions that we would be submitting to you on August 22nd. We listed Dr. Asch as someone that we were not going to call live, that we were going to offer his deposition. So they knew. And they made designations themselves, affirmative designations with respect to Dr. Asch from his trial testimony. Not just in response to our offering his testimony. So I wanted to make that clear.

We don't control Dr. Asch. When his deposition was first taken in this case, he met with counsel for the defense before the deposition and counsel for the plaintiff before the deposition.

We have -- we don't control him any more than anyone else does. If he is available -- for them to say he's not available and not have taken any means or any steps to see whether or not Dr. Asch was willing to come to this trial for purposes of that testimony, you know, they haven't done that.

But there's one thing I think is important to emphasize. The operative testimony in this case is the deposition of Dr. Asch. And what they're now offering is

really cumulative evidence to that deposition. That is the 12:05:01 1 2 testimony -- that is the MDL testimony in this case. 3 For the most part, and I haven't done a side-by-side 4 comparison yet, but the testimony certainly is cumulative 12:05:18 because they're asking questions about the same thing and a 6 lot of those questions have been asked and answered in what 7 you should consider the operative original testimony of 8 Dr. Asch for all purposes in this MDL. Just something I thought of, Your Honor, with respect to this being cumulative and asked and answered. 12:05:37 10 11 Those are all the comments I have at this time. Thank you. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. We've gone way past an hour and a half on Tricia's court reporting, so we need to 14 12:05:51 15 take a break. 16 MR. GOLDENBERG: Your Honor, could I just ask a 17 favor? I have a 2:30 flight today. Are we going to be talking about jury instructions? 18 19 THE COURT: No. 12:06:07 20 MR. GOLDENBERG: Okay. 21 (The Court and the courtroom deputy confer.) 22 THE COURT: What I'd like to do is take a ten-minute break, come back and finish this so we can get you out of 23 24 here. I don't know that we've got that much longer to go. 12:06:26 25 But let's do that rather than take a lunch break now.

12:06:30 1 See you in ten minutes. 2 (Recess taken from 12:06 to 12:16.) 3 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. 4 MS. HELM: Your Honor. I e-mailed the Kandarpa 12:17:56 5 deposition --THE COURT: I got it. 6 7 MS. HELM: Okay. I just wanted to make sure. Thank 8 you. 9 THE COURT: Thanks. 12:18:02 10 Okay. If I do permit any portion of the Asch trial 11 testimony to be presented, how do you propose to present it, 12 defense counsel? 13 MR. CONDO: Your Honor, we would ask that it all be presented in written format question and answer with someone 14 sitting on the stand reading the question and presenting the 12:18:25 15 16 answer, as opposed to bifurcating it, some videotape, some 17 read. We think the videotape will unfairly engage the jury 18 to the extent they'll tune out, so to speak, at the Q and A. 19 12:18:52 20 We think there's about 70 percent of the deposition and designated testimony, because plaintiffs have designated their 21 22 own Asch testimony if ours is permitted. We think when you 23 take all of it together, it's about 70 percent of the 24 designations in deposition and trial testimony are plaintiffs' 12:19:10 25 and 30 percent are defendants'. We think with that

12:19:14 1 percentage, it's just fair to do it the old-fashioned way with 2 someone reading the questions and someone playing the witness 3 and reading the answers. 4 THE COURT: Are you talking about both the deposition 5 and the trial? 12:19:25 MR. CONDO: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: So you say you want to present the trial 8 testimony by reading, but they should be precluded from playing the deposition testimony? MR. CONDO: I'm asking the Court to exercise its 12:19:35 10 11 discretion in order to, for basic fairness, have what they 12 would otherwise play and what we would otherwise play, even with our counter designations, have it all read because there 13 is no way, obviously, to play the trial testimony. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 12:19:54 15 MR. LOPEZ: Obviously, we would object to that. 16 17 First of all, the cross is attacking credibility. And as the Court knows, part of a witness's credibility is judged by his 18 demeanor on the stand, the way they answer the question, 19 12:20:10 20 things like that. We don't want to lose that aspect of this witness's testimony, especially if what they're offering is in 21 22 fact impeachment or cross-examination. 23 I'm not sure about these percentages he's talking 24 about. I really haven't had a chance, Your Honor, to look at 12:20:26 25 what's cumulative, what's not cumulative. I got the Jones

deposition 11 days later than I thought I was going to get it. 12:20:30 1 2 The trial testimony. I'm sorry, Jones trial testimony. 3 THE COURT: The only question --4 MR. LOPEZ: There may not be that much that's 12:20:41 5 different. 6 THE COURT: And I can't decide that. I don't have 7 any information on that. But I take it from what you're 8 saying, Mr. Lopez, your suggestion would be that if any of the 9 trial testimony is allowed, it be read, and the deposition testimony be played. 12:20:53 10 11 MR. LOPEZ: Right. And we can orchestrate that. 12 can cooperate with counsel how to orchestrate that. 13 Especially if there are some exhibits displayed on the video. We want those to be presented to the jury. Otherwise, we've 14 got another layer of complication here. 12:21:07 15 16 THE COURT: Are you proposing, Mr. Lopez, that 17 something be done by me to eliminate overlap between the 18 deposition trial --MR. LOPEZ: No. I don't think you should. 19 12:21:28 20 asked counsel to do that, frankly. I don't want to have to do it either. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. I don't know how I'm going to come 23 out on the 804 question, but if I do allow some or all of the 24 trial testimony, then I'll make a decision on reading versus 12:21:42 25 playing based on what you all have said. I want to think

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about that.

Okay. On page 46 of the final pretrial order, defendants ask that we follow the same practice in this trial that we did in the previous trials regarding defense experts who have been withdrawn. Namely, that plaintiffs not disclose the fact that they were experts originally retained by Bard and to avoid or stand by my rule that cumulative expert testimony shouldn't be permitted.

We also had the understanding there needed to be some showing that the point that would be made by these withdrawn experts is not available through other experts.

Is there an objection from plaintiffs on this procedure that we followed in the previous trials?

MR. LOPEZ: Well, I mean, just what we previously -we know how the Court's ruled. We have reasons to believe why
they should be identified because of the admission on behalf
of a party. But we're -- in this case we don't waive the
objections previously made and our position on that, but we're
willing to go --

I mean, Your Honor, I understand your position on it. You've stated it. There are other experts that are named experts, been deposed, and your ruling has been not to disclose them as defense experts to keep it neutral, as a condition to us being able to play the testimony. We disagree as we did in the past that we shouldn't be able to disclose

them, but we're not going to reurge that. Let's put it that way.

THE COURT: Okay. You've preserved the objection.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes.

THE COURT: But for purposes of trial, then, the same rules will apply. So we shouldn't disclose they were originally defense experts. And if you're going to use them, you ought to be able to make a showing you're eliciting opinion testimony from them that you're not getting from another expert so we're not having cumulative experts.

All right. On page 46, defendants ask whether Dr. Kessler or Dr. Parisian or both will be testifying at trial. Sounds like Dr. Parisian is intended. Are you going to call Dr. Kessler as well?

MR. LOPEZ: No. Dr. Parisian.

THE COURT: Okay. That answers that question.

Defense counsel, you raised in the final pretrial order on page 69 the issue of confidential documents. You say, as you did in prior trials, you raise the issue to preserve it. The problem we've run into from the prior trials, though, is there's a lot of case law that says once a deposition — pardon me. Once an exhibit is used in open court any confidentiality is waived.

You don't address in here what you want to do with protective order documents that are going to be admitted into

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evidence. What is your proposal on that?

MS. HELM: Thank you, Your Honor.

Also, do you want me to address the rule -- Local Rule 5.6 issue you also raised in your ruling on our motion for reconsideration?

THE COURT: I don't remember what that issue is.

MS. HELM: In your order on the motion for reconsideration you said to the extent an exhibit will be published or discussed during trial and a party believes the exhibit is confidential and should be protected from public disclosure, it seems the procedures set forth in Local Rule 5.6 should apply. And then asked us to address it today.

THE COURT: I think all I meant by that was that before it's used there needs to be a showing under Ninth Circuit law, which I think would be a compelling need requirement that the document should be kept confidential. I don't mean you need to go down and lodge something in the clerk's office before you try proposing it.

MS. HELM: Thank you, Your Honor.

We are not -- as a preface, as we did as in Booker and as in Jones, we are not asking the Court to seal the courtroom. And in most instances, and we have not yet asked that the transcript be sealed.

What has happened, though, is in this -- in Booker and in Jones many, many exhibits were admitted, simply

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admitted into evidence, and, frankly, they were never discussed. Or they were admitted into evidence and they were simply identified as was this X document.

The documents that were discussed, most of them were only discussed in part. And so you might have a 500-page document and four paragraphs were discussed.

We don't believe, in light of the procedures that are in the courtroom, the fact that the exhibits are maintained, only go to the jury and then they're gone, that the full extent of the documents have been published in open court. And we would like the opportunity to address, after the close of the trial, the portions of either the exhibits that were simply just identified and never addressed, because there were many, many of those. For example, in Jones we admitted pages of exhibits and then never discussed them. Or the portions of exhibits that were discussed — that were not discussed.

And I -- we understand our burden under Ninth Circuit law as far as sealing. I'm not sure those -- I mean, I'm not going to argue with the Court that that is not the proper burden, and I understand the Court's position on that, but we should be given the opportunity to address the exhibits that were not discussed or exhibits that were only partially published in the open courtroom. And that's what we're asking for.

We're asking for the ability, after the trial, to go

back, and it's a very tedious process, and look at exhibits 12:28:29 1 2 that were not admitted in Booker and that fall into those two 3 categories and to present you with evidence to try to meet the 4 compelling interest standard to seal those exhibits. 12:28:46 5 So I think that's -- the procedure is the same as 6 we're asking for, but I'm hoping I'm clarifying it a little 7 bit. 8 THE COURT: Well, as I understand you, Ms. Helm, you 9 are saying that we will handle exhibits that the jury sees and that get discussed in this trial the same way we did in the 12:29:01 10 11 previous trials; we won't be clearing the courtroom when we 12 get to a confidential exhibit. What you want is the ability to argue after the close of trial that an exhibit that was 13 admitted but not shown to the jury, or was admitted and only 14 shown in part to the jury, retains its confidentiality in some 12:29:23 15 16 degree. 17 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is that correct? 18 19 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So you're not proposing any trial 12:29:33 20 21 procedure, just the opportunity to make that argument after 2.2. trial. 23 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. And the finding that we 24 have not waived that position --12:29:41 25 THE COURT: Waived the argument.

12:29:43 1 MS. HELM: Waived the argument. Exactly, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: That's not the same as saying you haven't 3 waived the confidentiality. That's the issue I'm going to 4 have to decide. 12:29:52 5 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 6 7 MS. SMITH: And plaintiffs' position remains the same as we've argued in most of our briefing, is that when these 8 9 exhibits are admitted into evidence, they then become public 12:30:04 10 record. THE COURT: And that position isn't being decided by 11 12 what Ms. Helm said; right? That would be the issue we would 13 address at the end of trial, which was whether you're right about that or whether they're right that by not publishing it 14 or by publishing only a portion, they retain confidentiality. 12:30:17 15 16 MS. SMITH: Right. 17 THE COURT: Okay. I'm fine with that. We won't adopt any special procedures in trial. Defendants are not 18 waiving their ability to make that argument. But I'm not 19 12:30:31 20 deciding whether or not admission by itself is or is not a waiver of confidentiality. That will be the issue we'll 21 22 address. 23 MS. HELM: Your Honor, you asked me on Thursday to 24 remind you about the motion for extension on the Jones 12:30:48 25 exhibits.

12:30:49 1 THE COURT: Right. 2 MS. HELM: And my proposal would be that we address 3 both Jones and Hyde after the Hyde trial so that we're not 4 trying to brief it during the Hyde trial. Many of the 12:31:05 exhibits will be the same. And the issues, I believe, are 6 identical. 7 THE COURT: Any objection to dealing with Jones and 8 Hyde at the same time? 9 MS. SMITH: No objection. 12:31:19 10 THE COURT: Do you have a proposed date, Ms. Helm? 11 MS. HELM: 21 days after the Hyde verdict. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Just a second. 13 Just so that we're clear, let's say that October 26th will be the date. That's 21 days after October 5th. 14 12:32:02 15 October 26th will be the date for addressing this 16 issue with respect to both the Jones and the Hyde trials. 17 MS. HELM: Thank you. THE COURT: So I will grant the motion which is at 18 Docket 12440 and set the date of October 26th to have those 19 12:32:24 20 issues addressed. 21 Okay. Those were the only issues I had from the 22 final pretrial order. 23 Is there anything else any of you want to raise 24 that's in the final pretrial order? There's some other things 12:32:41 25 I want to talk about from the trial briefs.

MS. REED ZAIC: I have a red-lining malfunction I 12:32:45 1 2 need to point out and correct with the pretrial order. 3 Daniel Orms and Patrick McDonald are witnesses that 4 should be on our witness list. They've been in the pretrial 12:32:57 order and our witness list on previous trials and we've submitted deposition designations now for the third time, and 6 I realize that when I -- at some point when I was red-lining 7 8 the document, I deleted them from our list of witnesses. They're on the defendants' list. But I just wanted to make that correction. 12:33:10 10 11 THE COURT: So --12 MS. HELM: Your Honor, we have no objection. They're 13 known witnesses and they're actually identified on the defense 14 witness list. THE COURT: That's fine. 12:33:24 15 So I will add, then, to the plaintiffs witnesses --16 17 who is it? Daniel Orms --MS. REED ZAIC: Daniel Orms, O-R-M-S, and Patrick 18 McDonald, M-C-D-O-N-A-L-D. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Those will be added to the 12:33:38 20 plaintiffs' witness list that begins on page 23. 21 22 Ms. Helm, do you have something regarding the final 23 pretrial order? 24 MS. HELM: Yes, Your Honor. We have an objection to 12:33:58 25 a witness identified on plaintiffs' exhibit list, page 26.

Ms. Charis Campbell. She was not identified in discovery responses as a witness with knowledge, has not been identified, and the first time she's been identified by the plaintiffs as a witness in this case is in the pretrial order. So we have an objection to her on the basis of nondisclosure.

MR. LOPEZ: Your Honor, she is identified on BBA documents and Bard documents as a Bard employee regarding Dr. Kandarpa. We have no intentions on calling her, but we would like to reserve the right to show good cause should that arise to offer her at the time of trial. And we will not offer her or try to proffer her testimony without having brought that to the Court's attention.

THE COURT: All right. So the objection is on the record. I may not have to decide it if you don't call her. If you decide to call her, I'll be happy to address the nondisclosure issue.

MR. LOPEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll note in my copy of the pretrial order that the defendants have a nondisclosure objection to Ms. Campbell.

Anything else on the final pretrial order?

MS. HELM: I don't have the page, Your Honor, but I'll find it. But we have reached an agreement that if your prior ruling on Recovery migration death applies in the Hyde case, that the redactions to exhibits that we agreed to and

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finally accomplished in the Jones case will apply. So we will be using the as-redacted exhibits from Jones and only have to redact new exhibits. Hopefully that will keep us from keeping Traci here late the night before. And we've also agree to work on those redactions both — if it applies, both after we get your ruling and throughout trial so the documents will be redacted well in advance of them being submitted to the jury.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. O'CONNOR: I don't think we have anything else on the pretrial order.

Anything else on the final pretrial order?

THE COURT: Okay.

With these modifications we've discussed, I'm going to adopt the final pretrial order at Docket 12388 as the final pretrial order in the case. That means this is the blueprint for the trial and Rule 16(e) will apply from this point on, meaning that any changes to the final pretrial order will require compliance with the standard in Rule 16(e), which is to avoid manifest injustice.

Let's talk for a minute about the trial brief.

The defendants argued at pages 12 and 13 of their trial brief that the presumption in Wisconsin statute 895.047(3)(b) should apply in this case, and defense counsel cited a new case that wasn't -- that was the *Kilty* case, K-I-L-T-Y, that wasn't available when I issued the summary

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judgment ruling that said the presumption would not apply.

And I've read the *Kilty* case. The -- well, I shouldn't say I've read it. I've read what I think are the relevant portions. I didn't read the whole thing.

What was unclear to me was Bard states on page 13, "Bard submits that this question warrants more detailed briefing."

What are you thinking we need to do on this issue?

MR. ROGERS: Well, Your Honor, I don't have an answer to that and I'm surprised we said that. I think we pretty much said our piece regarding the issue in the trial brief.

And, obviously, if the Court wanted more briefing we'd be glad to do it, but I don't think we have anything else we need to tell you.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question,

Mr. Rogers, about the *Kilty* case, which was a decision in June
of this year from the Western District of Wisconsin that was
dealing with this portion of the statute.

The product at issue in *Kilty* was a respirator to protect workers from asbestos when they were presumably remediating asbestos contamination. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health and Bureau of Mines had enacted regulations that, according to the district court, concerned the, quote, performance and quality of respirator equipment, close quote. And I'm reading from page 2 of the Westlaw

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The regulations themselves say that respirators are, quote, approved after meeting the minimum requirements for performance and respiratory protection prescribed in this part, close quote.

And then if a respirator satisfied those requirements, they actually issued a certificate saying this is a certified respirator.

Here's the question I have. It seems to me this regulation that was being addressed in *Kilty* was a direct regulation of a product for purposes of safety and health. It was the agency saying these are the minimum requirements you have to meet for respiratory protection for people involved in asbestos. And without a great deal of discussion the district court said that where regulations comply — require specific compliance with regulations and the agency issues a certification, then the presumption under Wisconsin applies. Under Wisconsin law applies.

In my summary judgment ruling, I cited two decisions, as you know, from West Virginia, I think, which applied the same section and said 510(k) is not a safety determination and therefore doesn't invoke the presumption.

It seems to me that the regulation we're dealing with in *Kilty* is a direct regulation of a product to preserve safety. And the 510(k) isn't that kind of program.

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So when I read *Kilty*, my thought was this really doesn't address the 510(k) issue that was decided by those other cases. But I'm interested in the response you have on that issue.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, I do not disagree with you that the reg that was at issue in the *Kilty* case was a safety regulation, and we note that in a footnote that that was likely the case.

But I think the difference we wanted to draw the Court's attention to was in the West Virginia cases they grafted this notion of safety into the statute. Into the Wisconsin pipe liability statute. And that word does not appear in the statute, and the *Kilty* case does not ever say that the reg at issue needs to be a safety regulation in order for the presumption under the statute to become applicable.

And so, Your Honor, I don't disagree with you that they were dealing with a safety statute, but the court certainly never said in the *Kilty* case that we can only use this reg as a basis for the application of the statute because it is a safety regulation. So that's just not present in the language of the statute and I just don't think that it's there.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that point. Let me tell you the hypothetical that I've been thinking about on this issue.

Let's take an automobile which must comply with certain emissions regulations, certain miles per gallon under federal law, that rolls over and injures somebody.

Could a party under this Wisconsin statute say because this automobile complied with emissions regulations there is a presumption that there is no safety defect that caused the rollover?

MR. ROGERS: That's a tough hypothetical, Your Honor, I agree.

You know, and I think that the 510(k) process, similar to the reg at issue in *Kilty*, does require the regulator to certify or clear, whatever the actual words are that would be applicable, whatever the product was.

And so here we've got a product that did go through the regulator's process and the regulator decided that the product could be sold. And, again, Your Honor, I think that that scenario with the 510(k) process is much closer to the *Kilty* scenario than the emissions scenario that you just gave me.

THE COURT: But the argument you made seems to concede that there has to be some health and safety component to the Wisconsin statute.

MR. ROGERS: Your Honor, listen, I can't find a way out of your emissions scenario, so I -- I would think there needs to be some logical nexus between whatever the regulation

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is and the presumption. I mean that only makes logical sense. But, again, *Kilty* does not require the underlying bases to be a safety statute.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thanks.

Do plaintiffs have arguments on this?

MS. REED ZAIC: Your Honor, I agree with everything you said. I would just point out the *Kilty* court likely did not need to point out any aspect of safety because it was a safety statute. Those particular statutes are safety regulations.

And another point of -- to discern between the 510(k) process and the regulations under 30 CFR 11.2 is that in order to get the certification, they have to be in compliance with standards issued by a government agency. The agency sets them. We don't have them in the 510(k) process, as we covered last year in preemption. There's no parallel regulation setting specific specifications for an IVC filter. That is the case with regard to respirators that oversee and control performance and emission -- a particular emissions level.

So, first of all, there has to be compliance with a particular government standard that has been developed, published, issued. And once that certification is obtained by the manufacturer of the respirator, there is a process of recertification.

So the certificate is issued and I believe annually

they have to go back and get it recertified. These particular 12:46:16 1 2 respirators. That is certainly not the case with an IVC 3 filter. THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 12:46:28 5 What I will do is I will address this in an order that comes out next week. 6 7 I've got to address this, we've got to address 8 Dr. Asch, we've got to address the negligence per se issue. So we'll probably do one order that covers all of those. 12:47:01 10 Two housekeeping matters. Are you all invoking the rule of exclusion in this trial? 11 12 MR. ROGERS: Consistent with the prior two trials, I 13 think we would, except for experts, which is the world we 14 lived in under both Booker and Jones. 12:47:20 15 MR. O'CONNOR: We're going to live with the prior 16 rule. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So the rule is invoked. leave it to you to tell fact witnesses it's in play and what 18 it means. But experts can sit in on testimony of other 19 12:47:31 20 experts. Last point, which I always try to remind counsel of, 21 please remember in your openings not to venture into argument 22 23 just so that I don't have to interrupt you. 24 What other matters do Plaintiffs' counsel need to 12:47:47 25 raise?

12:47:48 1 MR. O'CONNOR: I don't think we have anything. We 2 don't have anything further, Your Honor. 3 MR. NORTH: Your Honor, just one thing. Couple of 4 weeks ago the plaintiffs filed a report to the Court regarding 12:47:58 the Simon Nitinol cases, and we would like to, the defense, submit something ourselves. We're a little concerned about 6 7 the proposal of 38 of those cases being remanded to various 8 district courts. 9 We understand the Court's belief, and I think the 12:48:15 10 Court's absolutely correct that permanent filters were not 11 part of the original MDL. But we've been talking with our 12 client about a couple of ideas, so we'd like to file something, if we could, two weeks from tomorrow concerning 13 14 Simon Nitinol. THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine. I haven't even read 12:48:31 15 16 what plaintiff submitted. I will not have time between now 17 and trial, so you can certainly file something else. Did you want to say something on that? 18 MR. LOPEZ: No, Your Honor. I'm fine with that. 19 THE COURT: Anything else from the defense? 12:48:43 20 21 MR. ROGERS: No, Your Honor. 22 MR. LOPEZ: This is -- as the Court knows, there are 23 other case, trials going, that have been set for trial. 24 There's one in Arizona, one -- there's different parts of the 12:48:54 25 country.

12:50:19 25

I know it's our obligation and I know it's been that way in other MDL's to keep -- even though they aren't federal court cases, it's in the interest of the MDL and certainly the MDL judge for us to keep you apprised of what's going on outside of what's happening here.

I want to -- I bring that up because I need you to know there have been a number of cases that are ready to go to trial, the cases have resolved. Those are confidentiality issues. It may be something we have to address some day.

Maybe soon. Maybe after this trial. And how much detail you want about that. Every judge is different about that, Your Honor, it's been my experience. Some want to know exactly what's going on in every case with respect to settlements outside of the MDL.

THE COURT: I'm not one of those judges.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. I wanted to find that out.

THE COURT: Those aren't my cases; I'm not responsible for them. As you've been able to tell, I don't believe in wading into your settlement talks in this case.

Obviously, if there's a trial's going in another case, going to actually be in front of a jury, I'd be interested in knowing the trial's going and I'd be interested to know what happens because that may affect what we do with bellwether decisions down the road or other issues. But I don't feel the need to know terms of settlement in those other

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12:50:22
         1
               cases.
          2
                        MR. LOPEZ: I just wanted to make sure about that.
                        The other issue are these early remands or the mature
          3
          4
               cases, whatever we've been talking. I'm getting -- it's not
12:50:33
               like people are calling everyday but --
          6
                        THE COURT: Did you see the order on that?
          7
                        Did we get that order out?
          8
                        Oh. Okay.
          9
                        We've got an order done. I thought it had gone out
12:50:45 10
               in the last day or two. It will go out in the next day or
         11
               two.
         12
                        MR. LOPEZ: Oh. Okay, Your Honor.
         13
                        THE COURT:
                                    It's 38 pages long. It takes everything
         14
               you've submitted and tries to provide enough information for
12:50:55 15
               the other judges to know what happened here. So that order
         16
               will get out.
         17
                        MR. LOPEZ: Okay.
                                           Thanks, Your Honor.
                        THE COURT: Okay. We'll see you at 8:30 on the 18th.
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                        EVERYBODY: Thank you, Your Honor.
12:51:11 20
                    (End of transcript.)
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CERTIFICATE I, PATRICIA LYONS, do hereby certify that I am duly appointed and qualified to act as Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of all of that portion of the proceedings contained herein, had in the above-entitled cause on the date specified therein, and that said transcript was prepared under my direction and control, and to the best of my ability. DATED at Phoenix, Arizona, this 8th day of September, 2018. s/ Patricia Lyons, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter